Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
The Quad countries recently met on the sidelines of the G7 Summit in Japan. This commentary evaluates their achievements with respect to global health security since the first in-person Quad Leaders’ Summit in 2021.
The Ukrainian government can always justify waging a war against regional grandees as part of the fight against corruption and the desire to prevent Western aid from ending up in the pockets of local clans.
Putin’s plan is to wait out what he sees as inevitable changes in the West and Ukraine. These days, however, Russia’s elites are liable to see defeatism in inaction.
Turkey’s balancing act between Moscow and the West has so far granted the Kremlin an important strategic advantage. Whoever emerges victorious in the presidential election will have to reassess Ankara’s position between NATO and Russia.
The global implications of Türkiye’s presidential election.
Foreign Affairs has recently published a number of articles on the global balance of power, the future of U.S. hegemony, and how great-power competition is playing out in the developing world. To complement these essays, we asked a broad pool of experts for their take.
The Uzbek regime is losing stability because its objectives increasingly diverge from the public expectations that President Mirziyoyev himself worked to create.
India’s technological prowess has largely been built on software. It may now be time to look at hardware, especially semiconductors, where things look promising but more needs to be done.
There is a simmering debate over whether the United States should seek to pull European states into its competition with China, or should instead reduce its leading role in the defense of Europe in order to prioritize security needs in Asia.
As China seeks greater commercial and military advantage across the world’s oceans, its expansive global network of commercial ports both reflects and amplifies its growing power.
The Central African Republic faces many challenges in adopting digital financial solutions, but it can learn from other post-conflict countries and improve its approach.
Janet Yellen and Jake Sullivan have recently argued that pursuing industrial policy at home is compatible with an open and fair global economic order.
Beijing’s focus on the real economy, coupled with the risks of capital-account liberalization, explain why the government has prioritized the renminbi as a means of payment over and above its use as an international store of value.
The Georgian Dream’s gains from rapprochement with Moscow are quite nebulous, while the risks are very real. But the party itself, which has made a number of unforced errors lately, may see things differently.
America will struggle to meet its global aspirations unless its leaders can make progress resolving its domestic controversies.
Researchers, policymakers, and civil society groups need to come together to clarify among themselves and for platforms what type of information would be most helpful to protect the public interest and what framework could ensure this information is feasible for platforms to provide.
For communities around the world, especially in the global south, it’s been clear for decades that the neoliberal “Washington Consensus,” which emerged in the 1980s and focused on deregulation, privatization, austerity, and trade liberalization, was a predatory and destructive model.
What has happened in Israel these many months has shown the power that people possess to safeguard their democracy when threatened.
Brazil’s position on Russia’s war in Ukraine reveals broader misgivings across the global south about the inclusiveness of the supposedly liberal international order.
While few Chinese companies have left Russia, and some have even increased their presence following the exodus of Western firms, even state-owned enterprises are finding it increasingly difficult to keep flying under the sanctions radar.
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