On December 12th, Dmitri Trenin spoke at the Endowment on the nature of the
new relationship that has arisen between the U.S. and Russia in the wake of
September 11th. Trenin set out to qualify what sort of partnership has been
created. The United States and Russia are currently engaged in deep 'geostrategic
cooperation' against the Taliban that includes serious intelligence sharing.
But beyond this, it is difficult to describe precisely what this new partnership
is. There has really been much talk about a new relationship but very little
substance to support its existence.
Trenin remains optimistic that current rhetoric could turn into a lasting relationship
given the nature of the post-9/11 security environment. In Trenin's words, "September
11th drew a line between the present day and the end of the cold war, making
the cold war not simply history, but ancient history." In effect, September
11th provided President Putin with the maneuverability to implement an entirely
new foreign policy strategy for Russia that had been germinating for quite some
time but would have been otherwise impossible to carry out.
It is still unclear what motivated Putin to throw his support behind the United
States. In Trenin's view, the argument that Putin acted out of pure pragmatism
is convincing. Putin may simply have calculated that there was no other winning
option, no way to keep the US out of Central Asia and thus decided that cooperation
would bring the most benefit. In the end, the U.S. has done what Russia itself
had already contemplated doing; it had removed the Taliban from Afghanistan
and bolstered the position of Russia's client, the Northern Alliance. Now Russia
has a buffer zone along its southern frontier. Likewise in Chechnya, it is possible
that Putin realized the failure of the military campaign to date and decided
that assuming the mantle of world leader in the fight against terrorism could
prove expedient.
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Pragmatism aside, Putin is very serious about Russia's 'European vocation,'
Trenin pointed out. If anything, Putin's actions since 9/11 have highlighted
his commitment to integrating Russia with Europe and it is likely that this
commitment is what has been motivating Putin. Unfortunately, this drive towards
integration also brings with it certain risks. In Trenin's words, "Putin
is on a very slippery slope," as Russia will have to abandon the last vestiges
of its superpower status in favor of regional integration. There is little conceptual
backing for this in Russian society and Putin may find himself out on a limb.
Currently the structure of the country precludes the development of strong opposition
to the President in the near term, but this is no long-term guarantee.
Future Challenges
Irrespective of the character of the new relationship that is forming between
the U.S. and Russia, there are some serious challenges the two sides will have
to face in the near future. Trenin predicted that Russia will have to deal with
three issues: U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, possible U.S action against
Iraq and the expansion of NATO to include the three Baltic States.
On the issue of the ABM treaty, it seems likely that the Russians have rightly
concluded that abrogation will be solely a unilateral American decision and
therefore there is little use in expending resources to counter it. Moreover,
it is probable that the Russian government has satisfied itself that whatever
system the U.S. attempts to put in place, Russia's strategic forces will not
be seriously challenged for at least the next twenty years. U.S. withdrawal
from the treaty will likely have little effect on the overall Russian-American
relationship. In the end, the proposed warhead cuts will be made and the strategic
dialogue will continue.
The issue of U.S. intention towards Iraq hinges on what course of action the
U.S. decides to pursue. Should the U.S. limit itself to air strikes, it is probable
that Russia would be able to accommodate itself with a minimum of complaint.
Should the U.S. decided on ground intervention, then Russian reaction will be
much more serious. In the case of such action, Trenin argued that concerted
U.S. action would be required to nullify Russian concerns. But, in the end,
these concerns are primarily financial. In Trenin's words, "Iraq is not
a sentimental issue," but a 'pocket-book' issue. Thus what is at stake
in Iraq is not a fundamental conflict of interests, but a question of appropriate
financial compensation.
The question of Baltic membership in NATO presents a more philosophical problem.
According to Trenin, Baltic membership would be a serious affront to Putin.
However, the Russian government has learned from the experience of the first
round of NATO expansion that loud and forceful opposition doesn't serve the
interests of the country. Thus it is unlikely that even this development would
be allowed to derail the favorable progression of U.S.-Russian relations.
From the American perspective, there are quite a number of things that Russia
might do to cause friction. Among the issues cited by Trenin was a broadening
of Russian military action in the Caucasus that could include incursions by
independent-minded Russian generals into parts of Georgia; greater restrictions
on the freedom of the Russian media; an attempt by President Putin to extend
his stay in power and the destabilizing effects of an economic slowdown produced
by falling oil prices. All of these scenarios are possibilities and each would
sour relations in their own way, but none are insurmountable. In each case,
it would be up to the U.S. to voice its concerns and attempt to steer Russia
on a better course while trying to preserve the ground already gained in relations
between the two countries.
In summation, Trenin concluded that there is much reason for optimism. President
Putin's power stems from his popularity with the people. This popularity is
based on a perception of hope about the future, not on the basis of past accomplishments.
An economic setback could seriously jeopardize Putin's political security. But
even if the situation within Russia should change, hope can be found in the
fact that the decisions made by President Putin since September 11th have all
been fundamentally in Russia's interests. The commitment of Russia to arms reduction
and military reform indicate that it is no longer thinking about global war
and the proposed reinvention of NATO-Russian relations stands to fundamentally
alter the nature of the Russian armed services for the better. All this indicates
that although a rocky road may lie ahead, Russia's interest lies in integration
with Europe and this will continue to be the foundation of a new U.S.-Russia
relationship.
Question and Answer
The first questioner asked Trenin to describe the foreign policy outlook of
the new elites of Russia. Trenin responded by observing that Russia is still
a work in progress and that it continues to change constantly. Of all the new
elites that have risen over the past ten years, none is probably more western-oriented
than the oil concerns. These companies and the people that run them are major
supporters of further integration with the West and they are enthusiastic about
the possibility of U.S. cooperation in the exploration and development of Caspian
Sea basin reserves. In Trenin's view, many of these individuals are fed up with
what they see as the excessively cumbersome geostrategic considerations of the
political establishment.
Turning to address the impact of possible U.S. victory in Afghanistan, Trenin
concluded that the military brass of Russia has probably turned green with envy.
The predominant feeling in Russia is that the U.S. has done everything right
in its campaign to date and this is not an easy thing for the Russian military
establishment to accept. On the one hand, a U.S. victory will alleviate the
security concerns emanating from Russia's southern border that had become an
increasing source of worry. On the other, the decisiveness of U.S. victory strengthens
Putin's hand in pushing through military reform by removing the ability of its
opponents to make excuses. Trenin evinced certainty that the lessons of this
latest Afghan war would not be lost on Russia.
Responding to concerns that the current rhetoric surrounding the U.S.-Russian
partnership resembled that which had been criticized during the Clinton administration,
Trenin explained that as of yet partnership is nothing more than a promise and
not a reality. There will be setbacks along the way, and a positive outcome
is not assured, but Trenin dismissed the fear that the term 'partnership' is
being over-used.
Summary prepared by Karlis Kirsis, Junior Fellow, Russia & Eurasia Program.