The Nuclear Posture Review unveiled by the Bush administration in early January continues to reduce the nuclear force from its current levels, down from their high point of some 15,000 deployed strategic warheads in 1987. The review, however, retains the basic concepts that defined the cold war nuclear arsenal and abandons plans for deeper, irreversible reductions envisioned by previous administrations.

Under the new posture, initial warhead reductions will track those planned during the previous Bush and Clinton administrations, bringing the U.S. deployed nuclear force down to 3800 by 2007 and to 1700-2200 by 2012. These numbers would be actual, deployed strategic weapons, as opposed to using less accurate counting rules laid out by the START I Treaty - a move hailed by government officials as "truth in advertising." The START II treaty negotiated by former President Bush and signed in January 1993 had called for reductions to 3000 to 3500 warheads by that time, with verified launcher elimination. These cuts will be achieved by removing 500 warheads from the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs, 800 warheads from the 96 missiles carried on four Trident submarines, and 1,000 from the removal of two warheads from each of 500 Minuteman III ICBMs. All of these cuts were planned under the terms of the START II treaty. The four Trident submarines will be converted to conventional missions, a move not outlined under START II. The total announced reductions down to 1,700 to 2,200 by the year 2012, however, represents a slower pace of reduction than envisioned by the previous administration. In 1997, President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin in Helsinki, Finland set a goal for both countries to field 2000 to 2500 strategic warheads by the end of 2007. The new posture does hold open the possibility of further, deeper cuts as international conditions permit, but also could slow the pace of reductions, or reverse them altogether.

Stockpiling Warheads

A critical component of the new posture is the decision to retain a large reserve of nuclear forces. Some warheads removed from delivery vehicles will be dismantled, but the majority will be maintained in the active stockpile for potential return to delivery systems on short notice (weeks or months). This "hedge" reserve of warheads that could be re-deployed, should strategic conditions change for the worse, was originally created by the 1994 Nuclear Posture Review. Officials then feared that a resurgent Russia might present a future threat. By 1997, however, Clinton and Yeltsin openly suggested that future agreements, such as START III, could include the verified elimination of warheads, helping to make future reductions transparent and irreversible. Tactical nuclear weapon controls were also put on the table for future discussions. The new review abandons these goals.

Cold War Triad and Doctrine Retained

U.S. officials have noted that since the end of the Cold War, the United States has reduced the strategic nuclear systems by over 50 percent and non-strategic systems by over 80 percent and reduced spending on strategic forces by almost 70 percent.

There is considerable resistance from some officials to further reductions or policy changes. In the most authoritative public statement on the rationale for maintaining large numbers of deployed forces configured as they were during the Cold War, then-Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Command Admiral Richard Meis argued in July 2001 that the burden of proof fell on those who advocate reductions to demonstrate exactly how and why such cuts would serve to enhance U.S. security. "There is a tyranny in very deep numerical reductions that inhibits flexibility and induces instability in certain situations, " he said. "We must preserve sufficient deterrent capability to respond to future challenges, to provide a cushion against imperfect intelligence and surprises, and to preserve a reconstitution capability as a hedge against unwelcome political or strategic developments."

These views apparently prevailed in the Nuclear Posture Review. The administration concluded that there will be a need to maintain thousands of deployed nuclear weapons in a triad of bombers, submarines and land-based missiles for the indefinite future. The diversity is required to "complicate any adversary's offensive and defense planning calculations while simultaneously providing protection against the failure of a single leg of the triad," according to Mies. That is, U.S. forces must remain capable of withstanding a first-strike and responding after the attack with an overwhelming and devastating nuclear counter-attack.

Meis explained in his testimony:

  • "Intercontinental ballistic missiles continue to provide a reliable, low cost, prompt response capability with a high readiness rate. They also promote stability by ensuring that a potential adversary takes their geographically dispersed capabilities into account if contemplating a disarming first strike…

  • "[T]he strategic submarine force is the most survivable leg of the triad, providing the United States with a powerful, assured response capability against any adversary…The United States must preserve a sufficiently large strategic nuclear submarine force to enable two-ocean operations with sufficient assets to ensure an at-sea response force capable of deterring any adversary in a crisis…

  • Strategic bombers…allow force dispersal to improve survivability and aircraft recall during mission execution. The low-observable technology of the B-2 bomber enables it to penetrate heavily defended areas and hold high-value targets at risk deep inside an adversary's territory…the B-52 bomber can be employed in a standoff role using long-range cruise missile to attack from outside enemy air defenses."

Russia is the only potentially adversary capable of such an attack against the United States. But the review abandons the long-standing military practice of configuring forces based on a concrete threat analysis and moves to a "capability-based" force that no longer requires the force to be sized against any specific threat.



For related resources please click on the following links:

Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review, 9 January 2002

Statement of Admiral Richard W. Mies, USN, Commander in Chief United States Strategic Command Before the Senate Armed Services Committee Strategic Subcommittee on Command Posture, 11 July, 2001 (pdf)