Below is an except from Secretary Abraham's speech.The speech is available in its entirety by clicking here.
A large part of our nonproliferation effort focuses on securing nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. I don't believe I have any higher priority as Secretary than to significantly improve the reach and effectiveness of our programs in this area.
That means making major progress toward ensuring that Russian weapons and nuclear material are protected from theft; that Russian plutonium production is ended, that excess Russian nuclear material is converted to reactor fuel rather than weapons; that the United States continues to lead international efforts to control proliferation, and that still more advanced technological tools are developed to detect and prevent proliferation and terrorism.
By my lights, if we can continue to make real progress on this agenda, then my tenure as Secretary will have been a success, no matter what else I accomplish.
The death of the Soviet Union a decade ago didn't just end the Cold War and break up an empire. It left over 40,000 nuclear weapons as orphans, along with a vast quantity of unprotected nuclear materials. It also left thousands of scientists and engineers from the former Soviet nuclear weapons complex faced with declining - or disappearing - paychecks.Complicating this grave situation was the fact that some of these weapons and materials were in places that were no longer part of Russia. And even those weapons and materials that could be found in the new Russia were no longer well secured; in the economic and political chaos that followed the collapse of communism, this new nation lacked the means to protect them effectively.
Since then, working with Russia's new leaders, the United States has safeguarded warheads, assisted in dismantling strategic weapons, and taken a number of other important steps to prevent Russian weapons and materials from posing new threats to us and to our allies.We have not undertaken these programs out of charity, but because they are clearly in our national security interest. The theft of only a very small quantity of high-enriched Uranium or Plutonium, the deadly ingredients needed to fashion a nuclear device, would be enough for a crude but potentially devastating nuclear weapon.That's why extra dedication and vigilance and determination are required to see that these materials don't fall into the wrong hands.If one good thing can come out of the tragedy of September 11, it's that our nation is now working more closely with Moscow on issues of national security - ours as well as theirs - than we have done at any time in the post-Soviet era.
Accelerating our efforts to secure nuclear materials; re-orienting technical research and development; reworking our nuclear safety programs to have a global reach - these are just some of the steps we're taking as a result of our reviews.We're accelerating our Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, a unique initiative that provides "low-tech, high payoff" solutions to the problem of under-secured nuclear materials in Russia.This is a program that is already a success story, with security upgrades completed or underway on 600 metric tons of weapons-usable material; hundreds of trucks and railcars in Russia made more secure through hardening and other measures; and material consolidated at fewer locations, making it less vulnerable to sabotage or terrorist attacks.
This is truly where the rubber meets the road, and the results speak for themselves. We are now planning to complete that program by 2008 - two years ahead of schedule. We're working with Russia to strengthen its borders, for example by installing radiation detection equipment at transit and border sites throughout Russia, to better prevent smuggling of sensitive materials outside of that country.And we're working to consolidate sensitive materials at fewer sites throughout Russia, thereby reducing its vulnerability to theft or sabotage.And by employing these scientists for peaceful, viably commercial purposes, we dramatically reduce the talent pool available to those states that would employ these individuals for their own evil ends.After considerable study, we have reaffirmed plans to dispose of 34 metric tons of Russian surplus weapons grade plutonium (as well as 34 tons of American plutonium) by turning the material into mixed oxide fuel - or MOX fuel - for use in nuclear reactors.As a result of these efforts, Russia will eliminate enough plutonium to make over 4,200 nuclear weapons.
We're securing materials in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Uzbekestan. We're working closely with the IAEA, as I mentioned. And I'm pleased with the progress we're making.Earlier I said my mission in this office was to effectively advance, maintain, and if possible expand the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation program.I strongly believe we are well on our way to achieving our goals.