Dr. Ernest Moniz spoke before a small audience of senior specialists at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C. on March 22, 2002 at a lunch meeting chaired by Carnegie Senior Associate Rose Gottemoeller. The discussion focused on Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Power and how these issues could be worked into the agenda for U.S. - Russian relations for the upcoming summit between Presidents Bush and Putin in May 2002.
Beginning his remarks, former U.S. Undersecretary of Energy Dr. Ernest Moniz described the situation he found in Russia's nuclear complex in 1998. "When you find yourself in a hole, the first step in getting out is simply to stop digging." Such was the logic behind the plutonium disposition agreement, an issue once again percolating in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Visits by U.S. Department of Energy Officials to the Mayak nuclear facility had revealed over 30 tons of separated weight plutonium under minimal protection, and security and discussions with Russian military personnel had revealed that plutonium would continue to be produced at a rate that would outstrip Russia's domestic disposition capabilities. The risk of material being stolen or diverted was high and Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran was also causing concern. As a result, the U.S. began to assemble a package of carrots and sticks to secure and halt the production of Russian plutonium, as well as to attempt to influence Russia to limit it's nuclear cooperation with Iran. Little progress, however, has been made since the last agreements in 2000 and the issue continues to percolate in U.S.-Russian relations.
Dr. Moniz noted that the persistence of plutonium stockpiles and the tremendous attention now directed toward WMD in light of the terrorist threat makes revisiting the concepts behind the agreement useful. Moniz noted that an extension of the work forged between 1998 and 2000 should be considered, and that there now exists an opportunity to place a disposition agreement in a broader international context that would involve more countries and encourage new initiatives.
Providing an overview of the past work on the matter, Moniz detailed the two packages that comprised the broader agreement. The first package, which was agreed to provisionally by both parties involved fast-track materials protection and controls upgrades, the establishment of a registry for plutonium and a long-term (minimum of 20 years) moratorium on plutonium production. The U.S. would also provided funding for dry storage for unreprocessed material. At no point, however did the U.S. insist on a permanent renunciation of plutonium production capabilities.
The second part of the program involved cooperative research and development to examine advanced fuel cycles with enhanced proliferation resistance. It was foreseen that success in this area could ameliorate or eliminate the inherent risk of current reactor fuel cycles, and leave the spent fuel issue to be addressed at a later date. Criteria for a more proliferation-resistant fuel cycle was to be established, and workshops would follow to work out the implementation of the new standards. Expanded research on geological isolation was also discussed, but this became a contentious issue between the the U.S. and Russian negotiators , resulting in a general assent to pursue a joint report studying generic issues on joint fuel storage.
The conditions placed on Russian-Iranian cooperation included adherence to the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement on conventional arms transfers as well as a cessation of all cooperation beyond Bushehr-1. Moniz said some progress was made on this matter and that there was an understanding that should the agreement fall apart or Russia choose to continue its cooperation with Iran, that enough off-ramps existed within the policy for a soft landing. Research and development programs could end and funding could fail to be renewed without significantly affecting U.S. national interests.
Moniz argued that the U.S. and Russia should revisit the program for several reasons. From a U.S. foreign policy standpoint, all parts of the program still remain in the U.S. national security interest, and September 11 has placed an intense focus on the utility of securing and properly eliminating weapon- grade material. Similarly, the Bush administration's energy vision has also given a boost to nuclear power, and therefore nuclear initiatives providing power and eliminating dangerous material would provide the administration with a contrast to the current flap over fossil-fuel emissions.
Many aspects of the broader political climate have changed as well. The post- September 11 emphasis upon weapons of mass destruction has brought international attention back to dangerous plutonium stockpiles and served notice that a "proliferation accident" would have profound consequences for the world. The export control regime in Russia has also improved dramatically since 1998, and Russia now stands in a better position to actually enforce a follow-on agreement. Russia has also made a strong commitment in joining the West in the war on terror and such an agreement would provide a tremendous opportunity for further cooperation and integration with the West.
Within Russia, Moniz noted that many more officials in the Russian nuclear complex are on board with the program than several years ago. A pragmatic realization has set in, stated Moniz - it's clear that the excess plutonium simply is of little use. Similarly, the Iran side of the fresh fuel issue has been resolved and Russia passed a law so that spent fuel could be stored at an international facility on Russian territory.
Moniz noted that the linkage of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation with the disposition agreement requires the most amount of thought if progress is going to continue. Quite simply, the U.S. could choose to de-link these; however he saw this as unlikely. If a broader agreement involving more actors was to be created, the U.S. could also simply leave Russia out of international collaboration on disposition and storage. Being singled out in such a manner could then be used as leverage to force the Russia's hand on Iran. After exploring these options, Moniz argued that the best course of action would be to establish a new Gore-Chernomyrdin-type agreement on Iran. A new administration, he noted, requires a new agreement and update. He noted, however, that the two sides approach this matter from drastically different perspectives. While the U.S. views a return to the strict auspices of the Gore-Chernomyrdin agreement as most palatable, the Russians, whom have had an unfettered hand in arms negotiations, view such a return as an impossibility.
On the topic of nuclear cooperation, however, Moniz noted that the Russians have expressed interest in coming to an agreement with the U.S. Russian officials, he said, are willing to agree not to a "1 Bushehr" limitation, but an "n-Bushehr" agreement at which the number "n" could be determined. Russia would not supply the fresh fuel for these reactors. Also, though Russia will not likely budge on the cessation of construction of research reactors in Iran, officials have indicated that restrictions on the size of these reactors could be agreed upon, and the proliferation threat therefore muted. Similarly, if indeed Bushehr 1 is going to occur with or without U.S. objections, Moniz questioned the point in prohibiting further reactors. A safeguarded reactor such as Bushehr would be cover enough for a covert nuclear program.
In terms of disposition, Moniz pressed for greater international engagement and a broadening of discussion. Plutonium stockpiles are a wider problem throughout the world, he noted, and security and IAEA physical protection principles should be re-examined and followed more strictly around the globe. Similarly, the U.S. and Russian agreement to halt further accumulation of plutonium can be seen as a universal good - everyone agrees to the principle of working toward a norm of minimal production needed to continue current cycles, and discussion about how this can come to pass needs to be held.
Moniz also noted that the current environment is prime for greater scientific cooperation on a less-proliferation prone reactor cycle. Only with broader cooperation on this issue, he argued, could something come to fruition. The U.S., Russia, France and Japan could launch a cooperative research effort and perhaps open collaboration to all NPT states or set restrictions on what states could participate. Moniz noted, however that if indeed the NPT was to be used as a primary forum for such an initiative, India and Pakistan should clearly be excluded.