For the first time in U.S. history, a president will deploy a major weapon system without knowing whether it will work or not. Exempting the missile defense program from required weapons procurement rules, President Bush will rush to deploy interceptor rockets in Alaska without any operational tests and after failing almost half of their preliminary development tests, including the last one. With every missile defense program behind schedule and over budget, all available evidence indicates that the Alaska system cannot work. Whether one is for or against this program, everyone should be troubled by the way the president is proceeding.

There is a high cost to be paid for this radical plan. While the overall defense budget will rise less than 4 percent, annual expenditures for missile defense will grow by over 10 percent to over $9 billion, making it the largest single weapon program in the budget. The cost of the Alaska site alone is likely to hit $30 billion. The Congressional Budget Office estimated in January 2001 that a two-site system (the president also proposed a site in California) could cost almost $60 billion. The president’s plan risks diverting scarce resources, attention and national unity from the real risks confronting the country.

The last time the United States deployed a national missile defense system, it cost over $25 billion (in today's dollars) and was shut down four months after it became operational, having been judged militarily ineffective. The Safeguard System fielded 100 nuclear-tipped interceptors in North Dakota in the early 1970s after 112 tests. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld should know the program in detail. He signed the order closing the base in 1976 when he became Secretary of Defense for President Gerald Ford.

There is a reason why, despite the best efforts of four presidents and tens of billions in defense dollars, no national missile defense system since has ever deployed: nothing worked. System after system was funded, developed, tested, and rejected. President Bush has solved this problem by ignoring it. Working is no longer required; it is simply enough that something—anything—be deployed by the next presidential election.

The key problem confronting any ground-based interceptor system is its inability to find the target among a cloud of decoys. To the systems sensors, the decoys and the warhead look like identical points of light. The Safeguard system tried to solve the problem by using a nuclear warhead to destroy decoys and any warheads in a "threat cloud." The Alaska system has demonstrated its ability to "hit a bullet with a bullet" in five tests, as long as it knows precisely where the warhead is, what it looks like and if the test decoys have grossly different radar and infrared signatures. But the Defense Department has not conducted any tests with realistic decoys, the kind U.S. intelligence services conclude any nation fielding a long-range ballistic missile will be able to deploy, or the kind that China and Russia have developed. Again, for good reason: the system would fail. It cannot tell the difference between warheads and aluminum beach balls. While the department will continue to fly demonstration shots once or twice a year, all 100 missiles will be housed in Alaskan silos without ever being tested against the realistic threat they are intended to defeat.

It does not help the president that his allies distort the threat to justify his rash action. The Wall Street Journal editorialized on December 18, "It doesn't hurt that there's scarcely an American unaware that North Korea already has missiles capable of attacking Alaska and is rapidly upgrading. Iranian and Iraqi missiles can reach into the heart of Europe." This is simply not true.

Iraq’s longest range missile, the modified Scud known as the Al-Hussein, went 600 kilometers, barely enough to hit Israel from western Iraq. Iran is developing Nodong missiles (purchased from North Korea and renamed Shahab 3) that travel about 1000 kilometers, possibly hitting eastern-most Turkey. North Korea launched a Taepodong missile in 1998 (the first and only test) that traveled 1320 kilometers, but had a small third stage that tried and failed to put a satellite in orbit. If the third stage could work, it could possibly hit somewhere on the Aleutian island chain with a very light payload, what some wags term "the golf ball of death." North Korea is believed to be developing, but has never tested, the longer-range Taepodong II missile that could travel 5500 kilometers hitting parts of mainland Alaska, bringing it just about in range of the proposed missile defense system but still not within range of its main cities (Pyongyang is around 6000 kilometers from Fairbanks). This program is proceeding fitfully and hardly qualifies as "rapidly upgrading."


Distortions and con jobs are not the way the United States should pursue its defense. While it may help solidify conservative support for the president's re-election bid, it does a disservice to the military and to the nation.


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