The West’s strategy to defeat Russian aggression is at a turning point. Delays in U.S. military aid have eroded Ukraine’s battlefield position. Russia’s defense industrial ramp-up outpaces that of the United States and Europe. As the NATO summit in Washington approaches, what is the West’s long-term vision for Ukraine’s security? And when it comes to vital economic support, what can European leaders do to compensate for uncertain American aid and to ensure that escalating agricultural protests do not threaten Ukraine’s economic lifelines?
The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is pleased to host Olha Stefanishyna, deputy prime minister for European and Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine, for a special conversation on these and other issues.
Event Transcript
Note: this is a rush transcript and may contain errors
Eric Ciaramella:
Okay, good morning, good afternoon, good evening, wherever you are. I'm Eric Ciaramella, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. And I'm honored to be joined today by Ukraine's Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ms. Olha Stefanishyna. Ms. Stefanishyna was appointed to her position in 2020 and previously served in a variety of senior positions in the secretariat of the cabinet of ministers of Ukraine. She is an international lawyer by training. I'm so pleased to have Ms. Stefanishyna with us today, as the situation in Ukraine is on a knife's edge.
Our viewers and listeners are no doubt following the drama in the United States Congress with respect to urgent military and economic assistance that Ukraine needs to defend itself against Russia's unprovoked aggression, the full scale phase of which has now entered its third year. But the war started long ago. Russia has been attacking Ukraine's sovereignty, the European security order, and the international system for more than a decade since it initially seized and illegally annexed Crimea back in 2014 and launched its hybrid war against Eastern Ukraine.
Since 2014 and especially since February, 2022, the United States, Europe and Ukraine's partners in the Asia-Pacific and around the world have stood by its side and in defense of the core principles of the UN Charter. That support has helped Ukraine defend its sovereignty and democratic way of life. Ukraine has made great strides towards its goal of leaving the so-called Gray Zone between Russia and Western institutions, and it's now on a clear path towards joining the EU and once the war ends, NATO.
But there are serious headwinds and challenges that we must acknowledge. Politics in the United States has intervened and delayed urgently needed assistance, even though most Americans still strongly support helping Ukraine defend itself. In Europe, there's a political consensus to continue helping Ukraine, but we're seeing pockets of discontent, most notably among farmers and truckers in neighboring countries like Poland.
It's important to discuss these challenges openly and to come up with a long-term way forward that is sustainable and is focused on our shared objective of ensuring that Russia's territorial aggression fails. So I'm really looking forward to today's discussion on all of these topics and more. I invite our audience to weigh in with questions online that will be sent to me. And with that, I'd like to invite Ms. Stefanishyna to make a few opening remarks and to set the scene for us. How does this all look from Kyiv at this delicate moment? Madam Deputy Prime Minister, over to you.
Olha Stefanishyna:
Hello, Eric and colleagues, and thank you for organizing this discussion today. I think it's particularly important as now the Congress—and it's another plenary discussion on the military support. And I really see this opportunity of dialogue today as another reality check between the discussions and the general narrative which is blossoming in D.C. and the reality which is here in the battlefield.
Probably I would use these introductory remarks for a major topic, the state of play in terms of the war, the reforms agenda, and the major needs at this point in time, both political and the military. So first, I just want all of us to be clear that war is not something that is measured by the headlines or attention from the political groups. War is the actual process and the actual atrocities which are taking place in the real time in Ukraine right now.
Just as I was preparing for my participation in this discussion, I got the information that Russia has started another missile attack. We have the air raid right now and Sumy region, the area near the Belarus border, has been massively attacked by the Russian drones and missiles, and civilians and civilian infrastructure has been disrupted and people died there.
The same has been happening yesterday in Odesa region just when President Zelenskyy and prime minister of Greece have been working there. And this has been another attack to the residential area where people died and many of them have been injured. So the war is continuing, the atrocities are continuing. What Ukrainians are doing is just we're getting more and more concentrated to survive through this period.
And when we're talking about Europe and Europe call on a broader action is not because it is a political choice, is the element of survival because the war is in this scale the first since the end of the Second World War, and it's in the center of Europe in the heart of the biggest European country at this continent and it is Ukraine.
And in the protracted war of attrition unfolding in Ukraine right now, Russia continues to demonstrate its commitment to using its considerable resources and spreading the war fatigue narrative. To bolster their military capabilities, the Russians plan to produce a staggering 2.7 million shells just in 2024. This is the commitment of one country not speaking about the inability to deliver on all-European commitment on one million artillery shells with all weapons immediately deployed to the battlefield, which is now Ukraine.
However, facing the deficit, the Russian army has resorted to terrorizing cities with artillery shells and ballistic missiles from North Korea, complimenting it by Iranian drones targeting civilian infrastructure. The longer the war is lasting, the more leverage for Russia and North Korea and Iran to scale up their engagement, to scale up the production. And in fact, they do not have the political processes in these countries. So this is just the decisions taken by leaders and the scale which could be increased on a daily basis.
And notably just North Korea has supplied to the aggressor with 1.5 million artillery rounds while Belarus has been fully stripped out of its ammunition reserves. So this is the situation on the side of the aggressor, and let's not forget that this is one of the largest manpower armies in the world. It's also important to understand that the Russian forces’ formidable grouping within Ukraine comprises now almost 470,000 of personnel including the aviation and the Navy to actively engage in the operations and strikes.
Russia loses five times more manpower than the Ukrainian forces because the major tactics which has been applied on the battlefield, because we were successful in destroying the military capacity of the aggressor in our territory, is applying the one way manpower land attacks, which causes massive and massive losses through manpower in the Russian territory.
And Ukraine's defense forces have successfully managed in these unbelievable conditions to liberate and de-occupy more than 50% of the occupied territory since only the beginning of the full-scale aggression and the war in 2014 showcasing with their resilience and determination that we have not been fearing the aggressor because we are fighting for our survival.
And we already have a very clear understanding that it's not the NATO allies who identify the threat. It's now the armed forces of Ukraine fighting in the small cities of Kupyansk and Avdiivka who identify how close Russian army is to the NATO borders. And with the decision to withdraw from Avdiivka, the touch line has become 100 kilometers closer to NATO border. So it's very important to have this understanding that the major decisions are in fact taken on a battlefield.
An unprecedented surge of the Russian drones now dominates on the front lines, escalating the occupier’s aerial reconnaissance efforts, and unprecedented levels of the relentless B-2 gather vital information for their military strategies. It has become possible because Ukraine has not been lagging behind in terms of applying the innovative technologies which allow us to save the manpower, to destroy the military capacity of the enemy, at the same time saving the manpower on our side.
So in that regard, we are far from the understanding that there is any stalemate and we are far from thinking that the war is in a phase where the political discussions could be taking place. In that regard, of course, our goal is to build also our own powerful defense capacity in Ukraine. We see now a strong outreach between the European leaders to mobilize additional defense capacity at the all-European level. At the same time, we cannot unsee or change the reality, whereas the U.S. has been the major military power at the global arena and disengagement from this, it also requires a transition if this decision is taken.
So I think that the major discussions which are now taking place in Congress, they're about the role of the United States, not in supporting Ukraine, but in the role of the United States as the geopolitical player and the major guarantor of the peace. And in that regard, any strategy requires a transition. You cannot change the reality which has been formed for 75 years since the end of the Second World War and the NATO establishment within one day. That requires a transition and that requires a transition to build a stronger European capacity.
And it could be a subject for discussion or political dialect, it could last for years or decades. But unfortunately now every day of indecisiveness and unclarity leads to the loss of the lives of Ukrainians, but also leads to less clarity of understanding how Ukraine could look from the military point of view just in one month when the military support from United States is not granted, because Ukraine's resilience should not be taken for granted.
My ability to sit here in front of you today is enabled because of the air defense which is ensured through Kyiv region and another missile attacks without necessary military support and with inability of European leaders to build the necessary capacity within the short period of time would not make it possible for us to operate as an institution, for Ukrainians to live in the de-occupied territories, and also to fight the war with clarity or with no clarity on resources.
So if we're speaking on this year, the decision on military support for Ukraine is vital for the credibility of the United States as the major player on the global arena, and it's a major milestone for building the transition to a stronger European capacity. But that requires time and that requires a discussion and a dialogue. And in that regard, I'm sure that this decision needs to be taken for this year while the conditions for building more balance, more capable European address to a military threat, is a must as well.
And finally, I want to bring your attention that while we are discussing the ability of Ukraine to resist and withstand, Ukraine's resolve is not applied only to our resilience on the battlefield. As you all know, we have applied for membership in European Union following the 10 years reforms agenda since 2014. And now we have concentrated all our efforts as the political leaders who doesn't have the guns in their hands, but have its mandates in the reforms agenda.
We managed to relaunch all the judiciary and law enforcement institutions, make them operational. We have managed to build more integrity and transparency in the way how the institutions operate. And we continue in that regard. And basically EU process is the major driver of reforms, which is happening right now.
And finally, let me congratulate all of us with the 32nd yellow and blue flag, which has been hoisted today at the NATO headquarters. And for the sake of our own security, for the sake of our prosperity, I really hope that the next 33rd flag would be also yellow and blue and it'll be Ukrainian.
And as one of the major military powers in Europe, Ukraine can protect and protects now the European native countries, European peace, European values, and we can do it together also to defend us from any future Russian and to secure the victory of Ukraine for decades and the years and the generations ahead. Thank you.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thank you so much, Madam Deputy Prime Minister for that really comprehensive overview of the delicate situation on the battlefield and the importance of continued U.S. and European aid. You put out a lot of very sobering statistics, including this new axis of alignment between Russia and China and Iran and North Korea. The provision of what you said was a million and a half shells from North Korea alone. Obviously, Ukraine faces a tremendous manpower disparity against Russia, which is a much larger- by population, by economy - country.
And so there is a creeping narrative I think here in Washington and in other places that the situation is trending towards a stalemate. Although like you said, it's quite different from a stalemate because actually Russia is making significant gains on the ground being able to exploit the delays in U.S. aid and the fact that Ukrainian units are not receiving the ammunition that they need to be able to fend off Russian attacks. But some critics claim that it's a lost cause, that Ukraine can't win, and that there's no way to retake the territory that's been occupied by Russia militarily.
And so when you think about Ukraine's goals for 2024 and beyond - and maybe let's just focus on 2024 because it's very, very hard to see in the far distant future - but how would you explain Ukraine's strategy for this year? We've heard a lot about active defense, we've heard, and you mentioned as well destroying and exhausting Russian military capacity, destroying the threat that they pose both to Ukraine and to NATO and Europe at large. So could you walk us through a little bit more about the strategic objectives of Ukraine for the rest of 2024?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Well, thank you so much. Well, there are two major perspectives is keep the country running throughout the war. It's vital for us and that leads us to a number of transformations which require building more economic sovereignty capability to support our armed forces through national budget, but also structural democratic reforms, which needed to be fully embodied in a daily functioning of Ukrainian institutions.
But of course, the situation on a battlefield is vital in that regard. We understand that the broader discussion about security assurances and security of Europe has been taken, and for us it's vital to survive through this time. I think generally, there is a global understanding that there's no way that this war could be over with the victory of the Russian Federation. It's not possible. It would mean that the alliance of Iran, North Korea and Russia has been legitimate and this provision has been legitimate. It would mean that the war crimes the whole world has seen online on the highlights of the media have been legitimized, have been justified. So it's literally not possible.
And it's also very clear to everyone around the table that Ukraine is capable to win the war with necessary military assistance. And Ukraine is very explicit in identifying the priorities in that regard. So it's a solid collective exercise, and it's not only for Ukraine to make decisions in that regard because there is a coalition of the military supporters of Ukraine, and every individual decisions contribute to the capacity of Ukraine.
In that regard, it's very vital to us that we already have a number of security assurances and bilateral agreements signed. So just to name a few, it is the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Great Britain and Norway as well, Italy is coming and a number of countries. These are not the memorandums, these are the solid bilateral agreements enshrining the multi-year military and financial support to Ukraine as long as it takes.
So there might be different discussion, but the reality is such that it's not a matter of if Ukraine wins the war, it's the matter of when does that happen? Our major task is to survive until there is a momentum of time when the war will be over to become more capable, to become prepared for the post-war period, but also to build our own resilience. As we know, Russia has been an extremely aggressive state, but at the same time playing on the same playbooks for decades and even centuries.
And we know that what Russia is doing is preparing for the largest scale of aggression already discussed to take place at the territory of the NATO allies. So building our strong defense capacity and shielding our military capacity and defense capacity from any political processes outside Ukraine is vital. So this is what we are doing right now, and we are really hoping that this year will be marked with a necessary decision taken by the U.S. Congress, which is vital as the transition to a more sovereign and more capable self-defense, which could be ensured by Ukraine.
But at this point of time, U.S. has been the major military capacity within NATO and ensuring the security in Europe, and it could not be something that could be evaporated over the day. This requires a transition, and this year should be marked by necessary resources dedicated to deliver on the commitments on the military support, which are the commitments within Ramstein within broader group of the states. And then the discussion should take place in terms of the more strategic steps.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thank you. I mean, that's a very, in my view, credible and realistic strategy that's focused on important political decisions that need to be taken now in order to build Ukraine's capacity, to build Europe's capacity, NATO's capacity, and like you said, to prepare and dig in for the eventual window when as we used to say, the correlation of forces and will and capacity might be such that Russia's advantages that it has right now might be much smaller.
And so a big component of that is like you said, these long-term agreements and the predictable multi-year budgeting support so that Ukraine can start to plan decisions down the road for its future armed forces. The decisions that you said to start new production lines in Europe and get European capacity for producing shells and other kinds of equipment up to where the United States is, for example.
But part of it is also about pressure on Russia, and we haven't touched on this yet, but what's your view of the effectiveness of sanctions on Russia and what more could be done to put the pressure on Russia's ability to fund its war machine?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Well, sanctions are rather painful not only for Russia, but also for the allies who are applying them. That's why every wave of sanctions should be really blunt and making sure that it has a very targeted, bold effect to Russia, to the Russian economy. The personal sanctions should hit on those who can make the changes in the Russian Federation and who really benefit from enjoying the European way of life and the European and Atlantic financial systems.
So it includes the sanctions in area of the nuclear industries, whereas Russia is applying the nuclear blackmail in the military, but also in economic terms at the same time being able to conduct business as usual with some of the countries around Europe and beyond. This is not fair. Personal sanctions against big financial and business groups, personal sanctions against propagandists and informational war, let's say, experts, they are vital.
And I think that the other area we should really keep on looking very precisely is the effective management of the frozen Russian assets which are frozen around the globe. That definitely requires a solidarity in the approach within the G7 group in the U.S. administration, but it's also vital because Russia should pay for the crimes committed, should pay for Ukraine's survival and recovery.
And if these assets are frozen, they need to work, they need to serve its purpose. We already know that Russia is extremely adjustable to these restrictions because their per se has chosen as the major domain of their foreign policy, the self isolation, right? So they have an immunity against sanctions and freezing the assets.
But when these restrictions start to work for other layer of purposes, it's vital and it's absolutely fair to build the proper ground for using Russian frozen assets to target it to the reform agenda, to target it to strengthen the resilience of Ukrainian administration, to target it to the military support, to target it to help those Ukrainians who have been displaced to survive throughout the war, but also to recover and restore the country which has been destroyed by massive Russian military aggression.
So a part of the sanctions and the restrictions policy, which should be bold and strengthened. This area should definitely be the priority for 2024 as another element of shielding the support to Ukraine, but also making Russia pay already now even when the war is still raging on.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thank you. So speaking again about a major kind of political decisions that can be made in 2024, you mentioned in your opening remarks that we are several months away from a major NATO summit in Washington in July, the 75th anniversary of the most successful military alliance in history. And there's obviously discussion about what the deliverable for Ukraine will be at the summit.
Obviously last year, many in the audience will remember that there was a debate over the issue of a membership invitation and there was not consensus there. So how is Ukraine thinking about the upcoming NATO summit and the likely deliverables and forward progress that can be made in locking Ukraine into the western security order in a much longer term way?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Well, I have a bunch of arguments related to invitation of Ukraine to join NATO, and I hope that the other day when I'm personally in D.C., I could individually meet everybody and discuss it, and I hope it's going to happen soon. But the major target for Ukraine is to become one step closer of having Ukrainian 33rd flag on the NATO headquarters.
NATO summit has been a huge impetus for Ukraine in terms of shaping the reforms agenda and security and defense sector in a more strategic way with a clear understanding that it should be interoperable with NATO. So for Washington, we will present the roadmap of reaching the full interoperability with the NATO allied forces and NATO policies.
I think this is the investment Ukraine provides in terms of the strategic clarity in terms of military support and financial support in Ukraine. At the same time, the issue of Ukraine's invitation to join NATO will be on a table as long as it takes until the decision is done.
I think that largely even if there's no consensus in particular in D.C. in terms of making the invitation happen in Washington, there is a strong consensus that Ukraine is a future member of NATO. I think it's very important for us and we are moving towards that. But I also think that there should be a bigger issue on the agenda.
And in fact, I think that it's particularly NATO Washington Summit is the time for the new Euro-Atlantic security pact to be agreed, given the very turbulent situation and very turbulent discussion on the role of U.S. in the European security and a very active discussion in Europe in terms of building European defense sovereignty and the new industrial strategy adopted. I think that for Ukraine, it's also vital that the Washington Summit will become the new Euro-Atlantic Pact building the strategy for the next decade of the European security. Learning from the lessons of war and Ukraine's membership to NATO is inevitable part of it.
As Ukraine, I just want to quote that according to the global firepower, Ukraine ranks eighteenth in the world in terms of the military power. If Ukraine were to join now NATO, we would have only five allies ahead of us, which are United States, United Kingdom, France, and NATO nuclear powers. And I think that the decision which has been far long ago has to be taken.
And Ukraine is not only the guarantor of the European security, NATO itself is the guarantee for the Russian Federation, the deterrence guarantee for the Russian Federation, and this is the language, the NATO language is the language that Putin understands. So there are a lot of angles to that.
We would have a number of really solid decisions taken on the Washington Summit, which brings Ukraine closer to NATO, but at the same time, broader global pact should be enshrined in Washington, and we hope that we will hear loud and clearly the message towards bringing Ukrainian flag to the NATO headquarters as soon as possible.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thanks. That's really interesting. And I'm particularly drawing attention to the point you made about using the summit as an opportunity to revitalize the Euro-Atlantic security vision, but particularly when it comes to building up the European pillar of NATO. And in many ways [inaudible] Ukraine's capacity [inaudible] and again, wanting the United States still involved in European security, but also recognizing that Europe needs to take on more of the duties and responsibilities itself.
So could you walk us through a little bit about your conversations with various European countries about this question of Europe's defense, industrial and military capacity, and how has that conversation also been part of the EU integration discussion and some of these visions of maybe European strategic autonomy? I mean, what role do you see Ukraine playing in moving that conversation forward?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Well, Ukraine is a fully fledged, let's say, player in this discussion, in this policy making process. In fact, European Union has just released the strategy for defense, industrial development or cooperation where Ukraine is not treated as a partner. We are fully treated as part of this alliance or this framework as a member state, meaning that the angle of this strategy is to establish the, if I may say so, the new market, doing that market of defense industry, which means that it would ensure that coordination at the all-European level.
It means that it will not be only the individual industrial potential of every member state. It'll be a coordinated targeted processes. And this is the lesson learned from the war because different capacities should have been combined to advance the military support in Ukraine. And I think that this is vital because Ukraine is now evolving its defense industry throughout the war. We produce and scale up the production based on the needs on a battlefield, and the needs on a battlefield in Ukraine are also all European needs at this point of time.
So that would take some time, but I think it would take a couple of years to make this strategy implemented, capable to make this process scaled up in a number of times. But we cannot start from the scratch. We need to ensure the transition. That's why, again, I'm bringing myself back to the decision which is needed now at the U.S. Congress as a necessary transition, either will be a decision on disengagement or more European engagement into this process. It's not possible to do it right away, it should be ensured smoothly.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thank you. That's really important that you highlight the criticality of this U.S. aid decision as a bridging mechanism while the EU and Ukraine really work on ramping up their defense industrial capacity, I do think that's a credible path forward for those in Washington who have been maybe a bit more uncertain about the long-term U.S. position on being able to continue to provide financing. I mean, this really shows that Europe and Ukraine are stepping up with their own resources.
So I want to pivot a little bit away from the security issues a little bit more towards economic issues, particularly as they relate to the EU accession process. So can you walk us through how you're thinking about EU integration in terms of timelines, in terms of key steps that Ukraine has taken and needs to take?
And how are you assessing some of the challenges that have appeared such as some of the protests and unfortunate blockade that's taken place in Poland and some of the other neighboring countries, which seems to reflect a fundamental challenge of bringing Ukraine, which is an agricultural powerhouse that always has been, and it will be into the EU markets potentially disrupting some common agricultural policies. I mean, how do you see this playing out? How much of a threat really is it and what's the way forward?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Yeah, thank you so much for this question. I think it's really important that I bring the spirit and perspective from European angle. In fact, of course, it wasn't the best experience we wanted to have on our way to European Union or in our bilateral relations with the Poland and some other countries. But at the same time, we knew that it's part of a broader discussion about identifying the place of Ukraine within a broader group of the European nations.
And basically it's all of us, not only Ukraine and Poland has to face the consequences of the Russian aggression, disruption of the logistic chain, the blockade of the Black Sea, massive shelling of the port infrastructure, railway infrastructure and destruction of a massive amounts of the products and affecting the major food crisis, the global food crisis.
So it's just the effect which has been burning in different areas, but at this point of time, it's not something that would affect strategically on Ukraine-Polish relations or Ukraine-EU relation. It's a very tactical process, whereas Ukraine, European Union, and I hope Poland so would take the necessary steps on our sides first.
Ukraine has made a major step though by unblocking the Black Sea Corridor and enabling the release of the grain products through the Black Sea, scaling up the capability of the Danube channels and scaling up the capability to release through the Danube channel and developing the border infrastructure with the Hungary and with Romania and with Poland as well.
So we have also put self-control measures on exports of different grain products. A number of measures have been taken at the EU level. Now the situation is really very much capsulated into Polish domestic policies. And I see that Prime Minister Tusk's government is taking very serious efforts to manage that.
That causes a lot of emotion, a lot of tension, but at the same time, it's if I may say so, a family business and I'm sure that both sides, Ukrainian government, Polish government, European Commission, have a very clear targeted understanding that it should be resolved, it will be resolved, and it would evolve to a stronger position of Ukraine and Poland when it comes to Ukraine's accession to EU.
At the same time, probably the last point, it has a very direct effort to Ukraine accession process because we decided to prioritize aligning ourselves with the rules and procedures in the rural and transport areas. So we will prioritize this as the accession process together with the rule of law efforts.
Eric Ciaramella:
That's great. And you bring up this important component with respect to the Black Sea export corridors, and it just shows how military strategy and economic resilience and politics are all very closely linked together. Because as you mentioned, it was through Ukraine's very smart strategy of applying military pressure on Russia's naval assets in the Black Sea and in Crimea in order to force open that corridor, which has been vital to Ukraine's economy, but also to relieve a bit of the pressure on the land corridors that have been causing this upset in Poland. And so is all linked together and it gets back to the importance of ultimately Ukraine's defensive capacity and its ability to defend its territory and its economic lifelines from Russian attack.
So I want to ask you a bit about the kind of political calendar in 2024, and I'm starting to take some questions from the audience here too. And there was some interest as well in your assessment of how solid European support is for Ukraine. We have European Parliament elections coming up. There's been some rising far-right parties that have been more pro-Russian, skeptical of aid towards Ukraine. I mean, how solid do you feel like the European consensus is, especially with the possibility of our former President Trump coming back to the White House after our election in November? Where do you see things going in both respects?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Well, it's really hard to assess or to make any very positive forecast. Things global and geopolitically and tactically are changing every 24 hours. Just half a year ago we were calm, being confident that we can assure necessary air defense capacity, and now we're at the age of unclarity in terms of the decision which will be taken or will not be taken by U.S. Congress. So things are really, really changing and evolving. So we are in the situation of the total anxiety all the time. It's all the time.
But at the same time, when it comes to the European perspective, we have a lot more influence and ability to build this unity because we deliver on our reforms agenda. We are structuring our accession process. We have a permanent exchange of the information about what's happening in Ukraine, what kind of transformations are needed, what are the loopholes and what are the blind areas we should pay attention on. So this is a permanent process and this is a daily job, daily business and a family business.
Unfortunately, we cannot really feel absolutely confident knowing that a dozen of different elections is about to take place in Europe, but we have no other choice but to build a relations on the bond with everybody. And we prioritize for this year the dialogue with the neighboring countries like Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, also Baltic countries, our biggest allies.
This is vital to build, to reinvent these relations from the perspective of the future membership of Ukraine and European Union to advance with the reforms agenda, giving more confidence in the solid commitment of Ukraine to democracy and democratic bit, and also making sure that we leave no room for political speculations when it comes to Ukraine's accession process.
It's a bit different from the accession of the other countries. As for us, being engaged into this process means surviving, living, being able to deliver and transform our country throughout the war. So here we are in a position to put pressure also on the European Union to make the process of accession relevant and fully linked with the reforms agenda in Ukraine.
So there is always an anxiety at every step of the way because these things are changing and the war is raging on. And something we were confident yesterday is not necessarily something that we're going to be confident tomorrow, but we have pretty strong stance when it comes to European unity. But also we have a strong stance when it comes to support from the American people, from the American Congress, from the American administration. We still feel that it's a strong bond and a strong support in Ukraine, but sometimes strategic support should be backed up by tactical decisions, and we really hope that we will see it really soon.
Eric Ciaramella:
Great. So I want to address this question of the diplomatic strategy as well for 2024 and beyond because it's been the policy of the United States since the beginning of the full scale invasion that we have wanted to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position for one day if it decides that it wants to enter into some sort of talks with Russia that would be able to do so from a position of strength and in a way that it could achieve a just and lasting peace on its terms.
So that was recently reiterated by our Senior National Security Council officials saying that by the end of 2024, especially with this U.S. aid package, hoping that it passes, that Ukraine will have the capacity and the longer term support needed to persuade Russia to enter into talks on terms that are more equitable and favorable towards Ukraine.
So could you give us a sense of the current thinking on that and a little bit of a reflection of what Ukrainian society is thinking? Is there a fatigue with the war in a sense that there would be some utility in talking, maybe not agreeing on anything necessarily, but on at least starting a process of talking? How do you see that and what do you see as the circumstances necessary for Ukraine to feel secure, to achieve its objectives if there were diplomatic talks in the future?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Well, I think that's all valid, what you're saying and how you refer to messages from the U.S. administration, but I think it's the wrong focus. The major focus is not how to approach the moment of negotiations. For Ukraine, the major focus is to continue existing and surviving and basically living, and this is the focus. From the broader perspective, it's already obvious and clear that Ukraine should restore territorial integrity and sovereignty, and first and foremost restore justice and take not a single step which will legitimize or justify the aggression, the alliance with the other autocratic states, the massive war crimes, tortures, rape, sexual assault against women, attacks to civilian population, none of the single steps should lead to justification of these actions. And Ukrainian people have a very strong bond to that. And people are concentrating on two issues, surviving ourselves, but also surviving the country and continue its existence. And whatever leads to this understanding is valid for us.
And in that regard, of course it's a very complex discussion. It's absolutely easy to shift down the topic of the negotiations, to distract the intention from something which is really important. And I think in that regard, we should always refer to a 10-point peace formula of President Zelenskyy, which enshrined in 10 points, the major mass of issues, which would be a major deterrence against the future aggressions, but also a major deterrence against justification of the aggression and justification of the war crimes.
So I think based on that, there is a peace formula summit to be held. It's not a one-day process, it's not a one-country process, it's a collective process because the level of the scale of war, the scale of blood, [the] attack [on] the world we have managed to build and secure since the Second World War, demands a global and collective response.
And I think that the first step or re-approaching this understanding will be taking place over the peace formula summit, which will be held as far as I understand in Switzerland, it's Andriy Yermak who's running this topic. So I really want to secure everybody from shifting to this narrative of negotiations because negotiations is the part of a bigger picture, and it's not about Ukraine solely.
Ukraine has so much knowledge about the Russian aggression, and we know that where the red lines are not put in for Russia, they will be moving and advancing further. So we have no illusions in that regard, and we have already a very unfortunate experience of building the consensuses, whether it's signature of the Budapest memorandum and withdrawal from its largest nuclear arsenal, or it's the decision of the Bucharest summit of NATO on throwing Ukraine back from membership because of the request of the Russian Federation and opening the doors for aggression in Georgia and then in Ukraine.
But also the Minsk agreements, which were the same negotiations, the same ceasefire, but has led to also the reality we are facing right now. So we are very wide and clear, very targeted and very committed, and as we are fighting for our survival and our existence, nothing can disrupt our attention. And I really secure the politicians around the Democratic camp to secure ourselves from that.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thank you. That's a pretty compelling, I would say, counter argument to focusing all of our attention on getting to a negotiation when obviously there's a much broader effort to secure wide international agreement on a set of core principles along the lines of the peace formula and the UN Charter, which every nation has signed onto.
So you talked about the first priority being survival, obviously, and I want to bring in a question from the audience here, which is about the situation in Ukraine with national unity. Conducting elections during wartime is practically impossible from a physical security standpoint, obviously from a legal standpoint as well with martial law, which is a democratic parliamentary process in Ukraine that has... It's not just the president declaring it, parliament has to vote on it every 90 days to reauthorize it.
And from what I've seen in polls, the Ukrainian public largely wants to wait until after the war for the next election. But can you talk a little bit about the kind of durability of this national consensus inside Ukraine if the war actually goes on for several more years, I mean, how do you see this potentially playing out? And can Ukrainians have the patience to wait until a different point in the future that's can't be envisioned right now in order to have an eventual election and get back to regular procedures?
Olha Stefanishyna:
Thank you. I've been answering this question for many, many times and probably concentrate on three major plans. First, there is clearly no demand from within the domestic society and domestic communities on the elections for a number of reasons. First, you are watching the war in Ukraine and we're living it. And when you're falling asleep with your kids and waking up in the middle of the night going to the parking or to the shelter because the bombs are raging on around your house, the last thing you think about is the elections in this country, right? So this is the one major point.
Of course, the challenges of war, the restrictions put in by martial law on our daily life. But the war itself, which has reframed us from the daily life we had, puts a lot of tension, a lot of emotions within the society, and it's another track of the job to be done to preserve the national unity. And [the] European [integration] process reserves more than 90% of support for by Ukrainian people. And that's why this is one of the tracks.
Of course, it requires additional mobilization within Ukrainian parliament, between different parties to identify the key priorities in their agenda and to advance and to survive throughout the war. Everybody are tired, of course, everybody are exhausted by war, by sleepless nights, by anxiety coming from different areas. But at the same time, it does not really have a massive effect related to any compromises in terms of the war.
Every single Ukrainian has faced the tragedy related to the atrocities of war, whether it's somebody who died on a frontline or died from the attacks or a small children - three months child died under the bomb in Odesa just a couple of days ago. So the demand for justice is the highest, and it'll remain high as long as the war will be raging on until the victory. There is no domestic demand on the elections.
But at the same time, I also find all the arguments I present invalid because I'm perceived as a politician myself. But then in that case, I invite the guy or a lady who put in this question to consider himself an observer on the elections, for example, in Kherson region where we will identify the electoral point, the time, and the information about who will be present there. And I really think that from the security point of view, things become really clear in that regard.
Eric Ciaramella:
Absolutely. Thank you for that explanation. So we're coming up at the end of our hour here. It's been a really fascinating discussion with you. We've covered a wide range of topics. I think you've been able to explain Ukraine's position and the criticality of support from the United States and action from Congress very clearly. So I thank you for that. I would just offer you, if you have any final couple of minutes, the closing remarks before we sign off.
Olha Stefanishyna:
Thank you, Eric, and thank you everybody who have been joining us online. It's not only a privilege and a pleasure to me, but it's a very important moment for me where I can address a broader American audience and bring more context, more reality and more understanding on what is now at the stake and how much things depend on the decision of the U.S. administration at this point of time on the U.S. Congress.
And I really want to say the colleagues and the organizers for this discussion, and I hope that this arguments, this explanations and the information provided will also serve to building the consensus on this vital bridge decision that is important not only for Ukraine, but globally, for Europe and for the Euro-Atlantic security.
Eric Ciaramella:
Thank you very much. Thank you Madam Deputy Prime Minister, thank you to our audience from the United States and around the world for joining us today. It's been a great discussion and we look forward to seeing you again in the future. Madam Deputy Prime Minister, hopefully next time in Washington, we can host you here in person. And thank you for your time.
Olha Stefanishyna:
Thank you, Eric. Thank you. Thank you colleagues.