The Russian armed forces have invaded and occupied Ukrainian territory for the past ten years—and waged full-scale war against Ukraine for the past two. During that time, Russian hackers have also been battling in cyberspace. But rather than fighting the Ukrainian military, they are often focused on making life hard for average Ukrainians.
The majority of Russia’s cyber attacks seem specifically intended to disrupt day-to-day routines by, for example, turning off electricity or making internet connections unstable. The hackers’ goal is to make life so uncomfortable that Ukrainians lose hope in themselves, lose faith in their leaders, and ultimately give up the fight for both their independence and territory. As odd as it may seem, Moscow has made demoralizing civilians in cyberspace a key pillar of how it thinks about winning wars.
But does it work? The evidence suggests probably not . Ukrainians have proven remarkably resilient, bouncing back from each cyber disruption—even garnering support from some of the world’s biggest technology companies to make their infrastructure more secure than ever. Civilians have banded together and rallied around their leaders in Kyiv. Ukraine has also become one of the most digitally connected and technologically savvy countries in Europe. Without discounting the suffering and costs Russian cyber attacks have caused, Ukrainian adaptivity must be part of any analysis about the role of cyber operations in armed conflict.
In many ways, history is repeating itself. Military leaders in many countries—including the United States—have long banked on the idea that sinking civilian morale would be key to military victory. For instance, in World War II, Berlin assumed that bombing British homes, electrical grids, and other nonmilitary targets would spark enough confusion, anxiety, and desperation that London would give up. The United States had similar thoughts in Vietnam.
Instead, scholars and historians have found that in most cases, the targeted societies just got angrier, and their resolve to resist only intensified. The reason this philosophy tends to persist is because civilians simply make easier targets than militaries—and political leaders want quick, easy solutions to hard problems. In Russia’s case, hackers also have every incentive to be as opportunistic and disruptive as possible—particularly if the alternative is being handed a rifle and shipped to the front lines.
Russia’s threats to stability in cyberspace are very real. But these disruptions may not work to the Kremlin’s favor in winning a war for Ukrainian territory, much less for Ukrainian hearts and minds. For as much attention as Russian hackers might demand, asking what they’re actually accomplishing is worthwhile. Focusing on what lessons Ukraine has to offer about bouncing back is even more crucial.