Assessing Climate Adaptation Plans in the Middle East and North Africa

Introduction

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is a complex and multifaceted geographical entity with a distinctive identity (see figure 1). It extends across two continents and encompasses a diverse array of terrains, ranging from arid deserts to fertile plains, though it is characterized by a predominantly arid and hot climate. It boasts significant natural resources, most notably abundant reserves of oil and natural gas, which wield considerable influence over the economies of some countries in the region. Owing to the unique amalgamation of its climatic attributes, its geographical positioning, and the intricate interplay of geopolitics and socioeconomic conditions within the majority of its constituent nations, the MENA region is one of the most susceptible regions to the physical repercussions of climate change

The region’s vulnerable populations and ecosystems face an array of severe hazards, including drought, heat waves, and other extreme meteorological phenomena. Moreover, the MENA region relies heavily on climate-sensitive agriculture, with a substantial proportion of its populace and economic activity concentrated in coastal zones that are susceptible to flooding. In the forthcoming years and decades, the infrastructure, economy, and demography of the region will face mounting stress as a consequence of the swift escalation in global mean temperatures, erratic precipitation patterns, and rising sea levels. These stressors will disproportionately affect vulnerable groups—such as marginalized communities, women, and youth—exacerbating social disparities, affecting migration trends, and potentially precipitating conflicts. Some scholars have linked the conflict in ‎Syria to the devastating drought caused by climate change impacts. Therefore, climate change adaptation and resilience efforts are imperative for the MENA region to address unique regional vulnerabilities, protect its people and resources, and ensure long-term stability and sustainability in the face of climate challenges. National adaptation plans (NAPs) are highly important to help countries within the region identify medium- and long-term adaptation needs, based on the latest climate science, to enable governments and societies to face climate challenges and develop strategies to address them.

In this context, this article thoroughly examines climate adaptation plans in the MENA region, with a specific focus on Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), using a desk review approach. The assessment aims to respond to the following questions:

• What are the current statuses of NAPs in MENA region countries?
• What challenges, weaknesses, and threats are countries facing in the development of these plans?
• What opportunities can they benefit from in order to implement the NAPs?
• Finally, what are the entry points for mainstreaming adaptation within national planning and budgeting?

The answers to these questions will help in understanding how regional efforts in adaptation planning could be aligned with global efforts to reduce loss and damage, achieve global goals for adaptation, and work toward sustainable development goals.

The Current Status of Climate Change Adaptation Plans in the MENA Region

Countries in the MENA region have made efforts to address challenges arising from climate variability and demographic shifts, such as the construction of dams in Morocco to combat drought, the optimization of irrigation water usage in Egypt to accommodate population growth and increased demand for reclaiming arable land, and the construction of centrally air-conditioned towers in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to cope with their hot and humid climate. These countries also will need to respond to future events like rising sea levels as well as recent extreme weather events such as heat waves. Despite these proactive measures, MENA countries have not yet crafted comprehensive climate adaptation plans.

The origins of climate change vulnerability and adaptation efforts in MENA countries can be traced back to countries’ responses to the mandates outlined in Article 4 and Article 12 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). MENA countries have prepared diverse reports aimed at exploring national susceptibility to climate change, planned adaptation measures, and associated requirements. One significant report is the national communication submitted to the UNFCCC, which each MENA country periodically compiles and presents to the Conference of the Parties (COP). This document provides comprehensive insights into a country’s vulnerability; ongoing or required adaptation measures; and necessary means of implementation, including financial, technological, and capacity-building components.

Similarly, the Paris Agreement, as detailed in Article 4, paragraph 2, mandates each participating party to prepare, communicate, and continually update their nationally determined contributions (NDCs), outlining the specific actions they intend to undertake in response to climate change. Furthermore, it calls for the formulation of a NAP to identify medium- and long-term adaptation needs, along with the development and implementation of strategies and programs to address these needs. The reporting framework also includes the Biennial Update Report (BUR), Technology Needs Assessment (TNA), Adaptation Communication (AC), and national strategies, each offering insights into how a country addresses climate change, spanning from assessment to implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.

Current Status

Under the UNFCCC framework, all countries in the MENA region are categorized as Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries), have no historical responsibility for human-made climate change, and have the right to benefit from the means of implementation provided by the UNFCCC financial mechanisms. Table 1 presents the status of reports submitted to the UNFCCC by MENA countries, including the distinct stages and circumstances among MENA region countries. These countries can be categorized into the following groupings under each reporting scheme.

National Communications to the UNFCCC

• Lower-income MENA countries, exemplified by Jordan, were the first to submit their Initial National Communications (INCs) in 1997, followed by Egypt and Lebanon in 1999. Conversely, wealthier countries in the MENA region, particularly those reliant on oil exports, such as Saudi Arabia and Oman, presented their INC reports considerably later, in 2005. In contrast, countries grappling with political instability, such as Syria, Iraq, and Palestine, reported their INCs in 2010, 2015, and 2016, respectively.
• Certain countries, particularly Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, and Tunisia, exhibit a pattern of frequent reporting. This proclivity can be attributed to various factors, including political determination, the existence of established institutional structures, the availability of qualified experts, and a willingness to capitalize on the financial support for reporting provided by the UNFCCC’s financial mechanism, the Global Environment Facility, coupled with technical assistance from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
• In contrast, other nations, including Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Palestine, and Syria, face challenges related to a lack of capacity and internal political turmoil. Consequently, they encounter difficulties in consistently reporting to the UNFCCC.
• Libya has yet to submit its INC; according to Libyan officials, it is currently in the preparatory phase.
• Specific oil-exporting nations, with Qatar as a notable example, have chosen a cautious, wait-and-see approach to reporting, primarily because of concerns about potential consequences. Qatar’s 2011 INC submission—the only one it has provided—contains data on greenhouse gas (GHG) emission sources and quantities, GHG mitigation measures, and climate adaptation. Countries such as Qatar appear to be influenced by ongoing allegations from certain nations, including those of the European Union, which attribute the escalating GHG concentrations in the atmosphere to the activities of oil-exporting nations, thereby endangering oil exporters’ primary revenue source. Moreover, these countries do not currently require access to climate finance, a fact that sets them apart from other developing countries that frequently update their reports with the aim of facilitating their access to climate-funding mechanisms.

Nationally Determined Contributions Reports

• All MENA region countries, with the exceptions of Libya and Yemen (owing to their political situation), have submitted their NDCs. The significance attached to these reports, which serve as the primary vehicles for the Paris Agreement, by countries in the region can be attributed to the global consensus on the agreement’s importance. Strong support from major nations like the United States and China has accelerated its adoption, making it one of the fastest multilateral agreements to gain worldwide recognition. This widespread support has fostered trust among the majority of countries, encouraging their active participation and commitment to reporting under the agreement.
• To date, the political situations in Libya and Yemen have prevented these countries from making progress in developing their ‎‎

National Adaptation Plans

• Although all MENA region countries have emphasized the priority of adaptation in their climate change responses since they commenced the reporting process in 1997, only a few have actually developed their NAPs. Notably, Kuwait is the sole country that has submitted its NAP as a standalone document to the UNFCCC.
• Countries like Jordan, which partnered with the German Development Cooperation (GIZ), and the UAE, which funded its NAP through its domestic budget, have employed their updated NDCs as a vehicle to integrate their NAPs.
• Several countries, including Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia, have started to develop their national adaptation plans using funds provided by the Green Climate Fund. These countries are at different stages of NAP development, and the completion of their plans is expected within the next two or three years.
• Owing to their respective political situations, Libya and Yemen have made no progress in developing NAPs to date.

Challenges

MENA countries face several critical external challenges in their efforts to adapt to climate change impacts. These challenges will be discussed in the subsequent sections. They are reported by the countries of the region in their national reports or through the international organizations such as the World Meteorological Organization, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and World Bank. Table 2 presents a summary of these challenges.

Climate Change Impacts and Vulnerability

Sea level rise. The MENA region confronts severe vulnerability to rising sea levels, with a confirmed average global increase of 1.7 millimeters annually over the twentieth century, as stated by the IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). Approximately 24 percent of the MENA region’s coastal gross domestic product (GDP) and 20 percent of coastal urban areas are exposed to sea level rise, double the global averages. Around 100 million people are at risk of coastal flooding by 2030; this vulnerability extends to forty-three port cities, including Alexandria, with projections aligning with IPCC reports.

A global mean sea level rise of 29 to 110 centimeters by the end of the century, combined with storm surges and saltwater intrusion, threatens water quality and agriculture. Capitals like Abu Dhabi, Doha, and Dubai are vulnerable, and Egypt, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia emerge as the most vulnerable countries.

Water scarcity. The MENA region is globally recognized as the most water-scarce area. Approximately 60 percent of its population already lives in areas under severe water stress and generates 70 percent of the region’s GDP. The IPCC projections under a 2°C temperature increase scenario indicate a substantial decline in freshwater availability in MENA, ranging from 15 percent to 45 percent. These climate-induced water scarcity effects are expected to diminish the region’s GDP by 6 percent to 14 percent by 2050, posing a grave threat to economic development. The looming water crisis in MENA has the potential to incite social unrest—an issue already unfolding in unstable contexts, exemplified by Iraq.

Some MENA countries have already experienced amplified water scarcity, including severe droughts seen in Morocco in 2022 and Tunisia in 2023. Other countries in the region, such as Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Yemen, witnessed extreme floods in 2022, further compounding the region’s water-related challenges.

Historically, the arid MENA region has experienced cyclical drought periods. For instance, over the past two decades, Morocco has witnessed a surge in both the frequency and severity of drought periods, a shift primarily attributed to the impacts of global climate change. The adverse impact of these challenges is disproportionately felt by women, who bear the brunt of increased household responsibilities, especially in securing water, while men migrate to urban areas seeking employment.

Anticipated increased drought will also result in secondary consequences such as sandstorms due to drying soil and desert dust accumulation in the atmosphere, contributing to land degradation and desertification and limiting solar energy potential. Furthermore, increased erosion and sedimentation affect both water and land-based transportation.

Extreme weather events. In the MENA region, temperatures have surged at 0.46°C per decade from 1980 to 2022, surpassing the global average of 0.18°C per decade. A +4°C global warming scenario could lead to extreme temperatures, possibly reaching 56°C in some areas. A 2°C projection foresees approximately 30 percent of summer months with unusual heat extremes. The IPCC AR5 projects that annual temperatures in East Africa and the Maghreb could rise by over 2°C by 2100, potentially reaching 6°C in extreme scenarios. Climate models anticipate temperature increases of 1.2°C to 2.6°C by the 2046–2100 period. Also, sand and dust storms are recurrent and severe weather events in the MENA region, causing prolonged environmental damage in their source areas.

The MENA region sustains substantial economic losses caused by dust storms, estimated at roughly $13 billion annually, significantly impacting its GDP. For example, in late February 2015, a severe dust storm originating from northern Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait reached the Arabian Peninsula’s shores, carried by powerful northwesterly winds. Similarly, in September 2015, the Mashreq region experienced an extended dust storm that affected the Syria and Iraq, extending into Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan. This storm, unprecedented in recent Lebanese history, resulted in five fatalities and 750 cases of asphyxiation.

Climate Finance

Most of the countries in the MENA region confront considerable financial hurdles in their climate change adaptation efforts. Even though developed nations have pledged $100 billion a year to help developing nations achieve their climate goals, according to Oxfam and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the commitments of developed nations remain unfulfilled and the funds mobilized for adaptation even dropped by $4 billion (-14 percent) in 2021. Thus, it will be crucial to ensure fair access to climate finance mechanisms and equitable distribution of funds that consider vulnerability and adaptive capacity. Yet allocating a significant portion of climate finance to adaptation projects poses another challenge, given the region’s pressing need in areas like water resource management, infrastructure resilience, and agricultural sustainability.

The Paris Agreement acknowledges the importance of finance, technology, and capacity-building for climate action, emphasizing the need to make financial flows consistent with low GHG emissions and climate-resilient development. Climate action in developing countries urgently needs more support, and climate finance from developed to developing nations has seen some growth. However, a rapid scaling-up, with a focus on adaptation finance, will be required. To play a critical role in building resilience, this approach should avoid funding actions that increase climate-related risks. Furthermore, on the issue of global financial structures reform, debt swaps and efforts to shift financial flows away from maladaptation and toward mainstreaming adaptation both will be essential steps in enhancing climate ambition and action.

As indicated in table 2, numerous countries in the region have determined their financial necessities for climate adaptation. For instance, Morocco estimates that it will require approximately $16 billion by 2030, while Tunisia has identified a need for $4.3 billion. Egypt, meanwhile, is requesting a substantial $50 billion in conditional finance for adaptation, and Jordan has specified a requirement of nearly $330 million. In 2018, the African Development Bank estimated the cost of climate change mitigation and adaptation in North Africa to be around $280 billion by 2030, with an annual financing gap of $10 to $30 billion. The largest gaps are projected to be in Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria. This shortfall can be attributed to the weak ability of the countries in the region to attract the required funding and investments to meet the challenges of climate change. Notably, Tunisia has access to 48.3 percent of its needed annual climate financing, compared to other North African countries. It, along with Egypt (which has 35.8 percent of funding), has relatively the more significant financing flows. In a recent 2023 analysis of the climate financial gap in Jordan, the current climate and nature annual financing gap was estimated at about 1,095 million Jordanian dinars, or 3.4 percent of Jordan’s GDP. Hence, these nations are seeking support from international funding agencies and private investments to implement crucial adaptation projects. Countries in the region that are grappling with political instability, however, have not submitted their national reports and currently lack the capacity to calculate their specific climate financial needs.

In terms of climate finance distribution, data from the Climate Fund Update in 2022 indicate that out of the twenty-one MENA countries, seventeen are beneficiaries of climate finance, with Egypt and Morocco being the primary recipients. The majority of these financial resources are allocated in the form of loans and concessional loans to support mitigation projects. It is worth noting that wealthy oil-producing states like the UAE are among the four countries that do not receive climate finance.

Moreover, the gross public debts of several countries in the region, especially in North Africa, have reached historic highs. The efforts made by these nations to address the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic have compounded the existing trend of high public debt. Given recent increases in interest rates, persistent inflationary pressures, and conflicts in regions such as Ukraine and Palestine, the burden of servicing this debt is anticipated to rise. Consequently, international climate finance becomes imperative for assisting certain MENA region countries in enhancing their resilience and adapting to the adverse effects of climate change. To ensure the effectiveness of climate finance, both the quantity and quality of financial resources must be considered to adequately meet the region’s specific needs.

Weaknesses

The information in table 2, drawn from national adaptation proposals and other information submitted to the Green Climate Fund, can be used to gain insights into the limitations and weaknesses impeding climate adaptation planning in MENA region nations. An all-encompassing analysis of NAP proposals or reports from the selected MENA countries—Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAE—uncovers a set of shared deficiencies and barriers. These inadequacies include the availability and precision of climate risk assessments, institutional coordination and readiness for advanced adaptation planning, insufficient financial backing, and an absence of climate data and a comprehensive approach to adaptation planning.

One common weakness observed in MENA countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, is the limited availability and accuracy of climate change risk assessments and risk reduction strategies. For instance, in Morocco, despite the country’s investments in climate change adaptation and risk management projects, climate change risks and adaptation needs have not been systematically integrated into regional development planning. This piecemeal approach results in fragmented and incomplete climate-related data, making it difficult to inform sound decisionmaking across various sectors. Similarly, Tunisia grapples with a dearth of comprehensive and up-to-date data regarding the impacts of climate change on its economy and development path, limiting its ability to set development objectives at larger scales. The inadequacy of reliable climate risk data and the limited access to such information are shared hurdles for both countries, undermining their ability to develop robust adaptation strategies.

Another common challenge is the lack of institutional coordination and capacity for advanced adaptation planning, as seen in Egypt and Morocco. Egypt’s policymakers still lack a broad-based understanding of climate change impacts and the technical skills necessary for effective integration of climate change adaptation interventions. This limited capacity at the policy level hinders the NAP process and future long-term climate change adaptation planning. Morocco, by contrast, grapples with a diverse set of challenges linked to the inadequacy of its institutional framework. Among these challenges are the absence of a steering document for the NAP process, limited capacities among key stakeholders at various levels, and insufficient information-sharing. In both Egypt and Morocco, these capacity-related issues are obstacles that hinder efficient and coordinated adaptation planning.

Insufficient financial resources allocated for adaptation planning are yet another shared vulnerability across MENA countries. Egypt, with its high vulnerability to climate change, requires significant investments to address these challenges. However, efforts to mainstream climate change adaptation into national-level sector budgets and policies have been progressing slowly. Public funds are described as insufficient to meet climate change adaptation needs, necessitating the exploration of other funding sources. A similar financial challenge is witnessed in Morocco, where despite various climate adaptation initiatives, private sector engagement remains limited. The private sector’s limited awareness of climate change risks hampers its engagement in adaptation activities. In both cases, inadequate financial resources and limited engagement from key sectors represent financial vulnerabilities that hinder effective adaptation planning.

Lastly, the lack of a holistic approach to adaptation planning is a widespread concern. In Egypt, adaptation efforts have focused primarily on specific sectors, particularly agriculture, water resources, and coastal zones. As a result, many areas remain unprepared to handle climate change impacts and extreme weather events. This fragmented approach similarly is observed in Morocco, where climate change adaptation projects have been executed in a disconnected and sector-specific manner. In both instances, this siloed approach to adaptation planning leaves gaps in regions and sectors ill-equipped to address climate change impacts. Egypt and Morocco serve as prime examples of the need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach to adaptation planning, one that considers the broader spectrum of challenges posed by climate change.

The weaknesses and obstacles to climate adaptation planning in MENA region countries like Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia are strikingly similar, encompassing limited access to accurate climate risk data, inadequate institutional coordination and capacity, insufficient financial resources, and a lack of holistic planning. These challenges hinder the development of effective adaptation strategies, so it is essential for these countries to address these issues collaboratively and systematically to better prepare for the impacts of climate change. By learning from each other’s experiences and focusing on overcoming these shared weaknesses, these nations can enhance their resilience to the ever-increasing challenges of climate change.

Threats

Previous challenges and weaknesses in MENA region countries could pose not only national but also transboundary risks, owing to variations in natural resources and socioeconomic conditions among Arab countries. Examples of adverse transboundary effects of climate change in the MENA region include the following.

Water resource disputes. Extreme climate conditions, such as rising temperatures and increased evaporation, strain water resources. Although the MENA region is home to about 6 percent of the world’s population, it holds only around 1 percent of the Earth’s total renewable freshwater resources. In 2011, the average per capita share of total renewable freshwater resource base in the region was 819.8 cubic meters, and by 2016 it fell even further, to around 600 cubic meters. By way of comparison, the global average share is about 6,000 cubic meters. Given that a significant portion of freshwater sources in MENA countries originates outside their national boundaries, and fourteen out of twenty-two MENA states share surface-water bodies, climate change may worsen water scarcity and provoke tensions within and between nations that share hydrological resources and geopolitical boundaries. For example, Egypt receives 55.5 billion cubic meters per year of the total rainfall on the Nile River, but this is only part of the total 1,660 billion cubic meters per year on average that falls on the eleven Nile River Basin countries.

Public health concerns. In a region already challenged by extreme temperatures, even a minor temperature increase could expand the habitats of disease-carrying vectors such as those that transmit malaria, yellow fever, and dengue fever, heightening the threat of vectorborne diseases.

Desertification. The expansion of deserts like the Empty Quarter (Rub’ al Khali) in Saudi Arabia, Oman, the UAE, and Yemen, coupled with rising temperatures, decreased annual precipitation, water stress, and recurring droughts, together pose significant stress to agriculture and biodiversity. Similar impacts are anticipated from the expansion of the Sahara Desert, which spans about 31 percent of Africa.

Conflict and human security. Resource degradation, especially related to water, can contribute to conflict and insecurity, particularly in weak states and regions already facing conflicts. Climate change can further destabilize these areas, exacerbate conditions on the ground, and lead to forced migration. As seen in the case of Syria, conditions such as drought can lead to or exacerbate conflict.

Opportunities

In spite of the weaknesses and threats mentioned above, the MENA region has a number of opportunities for taking action to address climate change. In particular, the region has made strides in raising awareness of the importance of climate change adaptation efforts. Two consecutive COPs hosted in the MENA region—COP27 in Egypt in 2022 and COP28 in the UAE in 2023—provided a platform for citizens and policymakers to understand the pressing issues related to climate change and its consequences. The MENA region, characterized by its diverse climate challenges, has gained a heightened sense of urgency in addressing these issues thanks to the international attention brought by hosting these conferences. The discussions and commitments made at these events have contributed to increased knowledge and action regarding climate adaptation and mitigation strategies in the region.

In addition, younger people in the MENA region are ready for climate action. More than 55 percent of the MENA population is under thirty years of age, and the role of youth in climate change adaptation is of paramount importance. Young people in the MENA region are not just passive victims of the climate crisis; they are proactive agents of change who are leading innovative, community-based climate initiatives. Even though they face challenges in accessing information and capacity-building opportunities, they remain at the forefront of climate action, working to protect their communities and ways of life. Their active participation in climate governance, policymaking, and climate justice initiatives is essential for ensuring that the region effectively addresses the challenges posed by climate change and benefits from the innovation and energy of its youth.

MENA countries’ NDC screenings demonstrate that these countries pay great attention to the role of youth when dealing with climate change. For instance, Egypt is encouraging youth involvement in the green transition through skills training and incentives, aiming to foster green entrepreneurship. The UAE is investing heavily in youth development for climate engagement, with initiatives like the Emirates Youth Climate Strategy 2018–2021 and the UAE Youth Climate Delegates Program (YCDP) 2022–2023, as well as events promoting sustainability. Jordan also is investing in youth as future decisionmakers for climate adaptation, integrating climate change into education and empowering a dedicated national delegation for effective participation in UNFCCC negotiations, alongside supporting youth engagement in global climate networks. The rest of the countries in the region, such as Morocco and Tunisia, have also identified several measures for integrating youth in their climate plans and actions.

Finally, cooperation and the exchange of knowledge among MENA countries, especially those grappling with similar climate challenges, will be instrumental in mitigating the adverse effects of climate change. UAE Minister of Climate Change and the Environment Mariam Bint Mohammed Almheiri has highlighted the country’s unwavering dedication to fostering collaboration among MENA nations. The primary focus is on reducing carbon emissions and enhancing climate adaptation, setting an example for the region. Information and experience sharing is particularly crucial for countries facing delays in climate action, often owing to political or economic constraints. This collaborative approach can act as a catalyst, providing these countries with a pivotal starting point to catch up and align their climate aspirations with global objectives.

In this context, the emphasis on inclusivity in the collective response to climate change, acknowledged by organizations such as the UNDP, underscores the essential nature of shared knowledge and cooperation. The active participation of specific countries and organizations in the region in addressing significant climate challenges, while concurrently working to establish a comprehensive, equitable framework to achieve national adaptation goals, demonstrates leadership in advancing climate resilience and sustainable development.

Conclusion

In the realm of climate change adaptation planning, the MENA region faces challenges, weaknesses, threats, and opportunities. This is of paramount significance in ‎light of the escalating perils stemming from climate change impacts, notably the increasing ‎frequency and intensity of extreme weather events.‎ The policy conclusions reached in ths paper can be summarized as follows.

Enhancing reporting and planning efficiency. Given the critical importance of climate change adaptation, it is imperative for all nations in the MENA region to consistently report to the UNFCCC. Special attention should be directed toward supporting countries currently facing political challenges, like Libya and Yemen, in fulfilling their reporting obligations.

Addressing delayed NAPs. Acknowledging the significance of prioritizing adaptation efforts, there is a need to investigate and address the delays in developing NAPs among some countries in the region. Identifying and overcoming underlying reasons for delays will be crucial for effective climate resilience.

Overcoming external challenges. Sea level rise, water scarcity, and extreme weather events demand immediate attention. Priority should be given to securing and improving the availability, accessibility, and quality of financial resources for effective climate change adaptation.

Mitigating weaknesses in adaptation planning. Efforts should focus on rectifying weaknesses identified in the study, including the absence of NAPs in many countries; the lack of integrated approaches; institutional fragmentation; and insufficient engagement of municipalities, local communities, and the private sector. Addressing misconceptions among policymakers and improving access to information and tools is pivotal for avoiding maladaptation.

Mitigating threats through collaboration. To mitigate threats related to water resource disputes, disease vectors, desertification, and potential conflict, collaborative efforts and knowledge exchange among countries facing similar climate impacts will be essential. Learning from successful models, particularly in the GCC states, can provide valuable insights for weaker nations.

Integrating adaptation with sustainable development. Aligning climate adaptation strategies with disaster risk reduction and national sustainable development objectives will be crucial. This integrated approach ensures a harmonized and comprehensive policy framework that maximizes effectiveness across various sectors.

Defining entry points for adaptation policies. Establishing clear entry points, such as legislative frameworks, institutional capacity building, and public awareness campaigns, will be pivotal for mainstreaming adaptation policies. This approach ensures the effective implementation of climate adaptation measures at national, sectoral, local community, and project levels.