• Commentary

    U.S. Must Reappraise Weaponry

    • Research

    U.S. Proliferation Policy and the Campaign Against Terror

    • September 17, 2001

    Tuesday's terror attacks on New York and Washington DC should bring about a major shift in US nonproliferation policies. Until now, the main goal of US nonproliferation policy has been to prevent the emergence of new nuclear nations. After Tuesday's terror attacks, however, the focus of US efforts is to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. In most ways these policies are complementary and not in competition. But making the shift will pose risks and require tradeoffs.

    • Commentary

    U.S. Proliferation Policy and the Campaign Against Terror

    • Research

    When Airplanes Become Weapons of Mass Destruction

    • September 14, 2001

    The horrific September 11 attacks will change forever the way we assess threats to the United States. This catastrophe crossed the line from conventional terrorism to terrorism with weapons of mass destruction. The terrorists caused thousands of casualties not with chemical, biological or nuclear agents, but with aviation fuel. As the victims are recovered and remembered, the attacks should force a painful reappraisal of the threats all nations face in the 21st century.

    • Commentary

    New Enemies Demand New Strategies as the Cold War Ends

    • Research

    A Heirarchy of Risks

    • September 10, 2001

    Former Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory Siegfried Hecker warns that the enormous nuclear complex in Russia still represents the gravest danger to the United States. At Carnegie on September 7, he detailed his list of the most serious nuclear threats facing the country, beginning with "avoiding a nuclear exchange" with Russia.

    • Commentary

    If China Builds More Warheads

    • Commentary

    Offense, Defense, and Unilateralism in Strategic Arms Control

    • Research

    Reversing Course on Plutonium: An Abdication of Responsibility

    • August 21, 2001

    The Bush administration may soon abandon programs to eliminate excess plutonium from nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia. Associate Jon Wolfsthal argues that failure to follow through on efforts to dispose of this material would be an abdication of the national and international responsibility to safeguard future generations from the nuclear legacy of the Cold War.

    • Research

    Getting to No

    • August 17, 2001

    Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld returned empty-handed from a truncated set of 'consultations' with Russian President Putin and Defense Minister Ivanov on the issues of missile defenses and nuclear reductions. The failure of the United States to put forward detailed positions regarding reductions in nuclear weapons or missile defense deployments has created the impression in Moscow that these talks are nothing more than a "box checking" exercise designed to provide cover for a future U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. This failure and impression is bad enough. But remarks by Secretary Rumsfeld on the nature of negotiations and treaties promises to make matters worse and raise serious doubts about the ability of this key official to develop the new strategic framework espoused by President Bush.

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