Regional Missile Arsenals: Strategies and Drivers

Table of Contents

General insecurity in the Indo-Pacific has risen in recent years, but the two most likely flash points that could result in a major conflict are the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula (see map 1). As a result, this report focuses largely on the primary powers implicated in these potential flash points, including China, North Korea, and the United States. Australia, Japan, and South Korea, the preeminent regional U.S. allies, are also significant players. While South Korea has developed a robust arsenal of missiles over decades, both Australia and Japan are quickly adapting to what each perceives as a less secure region.

The regional missile arsenals of other relevant states that could bear on potential crises in the Indo-Pacific—most notably, India and Russia—are not discussed in this chapter due to their limited direct bearing on potential conflicts in the Taiwan Strait or the Korean Peninsula. Both states are discussed in greater detail further in the report; Russia’s role in the lead-up to the collapse of the INF Treaty, in particular, is discussed at length in chapter 3, which focuses more broadly on the United States’ conventional missile development plans for the Indo-Pacific.

General insecurity in the Indo-Pacific has risen in recent years, but the two most likely flash points that could result in a major conflict are the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula.

China

China possesses a large, diverse, and growing arsenal of nuclear and non-nuclear missiles across all range classes and types. While Chinese missile forces do not outsize those of the United States in all categories, Beijing notably possesses a much larger arsenal of ground-based short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles than does the United States, which had forgone missiles with a range of 500–5,500 kilometers due to the 1987 INF Treaty. China’s efforts at developing a capable missile force trace their origins to the early Cold War, with the primary motivator initially being the search for a reliable means of long-range nuclear weapons delivery. The Second Artillery Corps of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the antecedent organization to today’s PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), was stood up in 1966, two years after China’s first nuclear test. By the 1980s and 1990s, after China had developed and deployed a limited number of large, liquid-propellant strategic missiles capable of ranging the contiguous United States, Beijing embarked on a broader missile modernization effort. Bureaucratic and industrial drivers during that time, rather than a specific, top-down strategic directive, led to rapid growth in China’s missile capabilities—particularly regional missiles.¹

The growth of China’s missile forces in the post–Cold War era has further coincided with Beijing’s broader economic growth and concomitant increases in military spending. Moreover, while China’s longer-range missiles during the Cold War were exclusively nuclear, over the last three decades, Beijing has built up a potent force of conventional and dual-capable missiles up through intermediate ranges.² During the early 1990s, China began to introduce new, short-range missiles, such as the conventional, single-stage, solid-propellant DF-15, to bases in range of Taiwan. An acceleration in the growth of certain classes of Chinese missiles in the late 2010s and early 2020s, such as hypersonic missiles and intermediate-range missiles, has coincided with growing threat perceptions vis-à-vis the United States. While China’s surface-attack missile forces are composed primarily of ballistic missiles, including ballistic missiles with MaRVs, Beijing has also pursued and deployed cruise missiles in land-attack roles.³ Finally, China is the first country to have deployed an operational hypersonic boost-glide vehicle-equipped missile, the DF-17, for a theater mission.⁴ The contours of Chinese missile forces continue to shift amid a broader military modernization and spending effort to realize, by the centennial of the People’s Republic’s founding in 2049, what Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military" (see figure 3).⁵

Contours of China’s Regional Missile Forces

The majority of Chinese regional missiles are ground launched and operated by the PLARF. Pursuant to military reforms in late 2015, the PLARF was established as a successor to the Second Artillery Corps, the original military organization that was charged with the operation of Chinese missile forces upon its creation in 1966. The PLARF, alongside the PLA Ground Force, PLA Navy, PLA Air Force, and PLA Strategic Support Force, is an independent branch of the Chinese military and reports to the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party.⁶ Importantly, the PLARF oversees the totality of China’s ground-based missile forces, including all nuclear-capable missiles up to intercontinental-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Of the PLARF’s nine primary organizational subdivisions, known as bases,⁷ six (Bases 61 through 66) are operational missile units.⁸ These units vary in their composition: some are composed nearly exclusively of ICBMs (such as Base 66), and others contain a mix of conventional, dual-capable, and theater-range nuclear systems (such as Base 61).⁹ Each PLARF base is further subdivided into missile brigades.

Two Chinese theater-range, ground-launched missile systems—and a possible third—are dual-capable. One of these—the medium-range family of ballistic missiles known as the DF-21/CH-SS-5—features two exclusively nuclear-armed variants: the DF-21A and another with an unknown Chinese designation (occasionally reported as the DF-21E). Two other variants of the DF-21, including the DF-21C and DF-21D, are conventional. The DF-21A features externally observable differences that distinguish it from the land-attack variant DF-21C and the anti-ship variant DF-21D (discussed in greater detail later). The DF-26 is the second Chinese dual-capable regional system. It is a road-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic missile that can range to the U.S. territory of Guam from most easterly launch points in mainland China. Since it was first deployed in 2016, the overall inventory of available DF-26 launchers has rapidly grown in China. According to the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual estimates, the PLARF operated between sixteen and thirty DF-26 launchers in 2018, eighty in 2019, and two hundred by 2020.¹⁰ In 2022, the United States assessed that China possessed approximately 250 DF-26 launchers.¹¹ The DF-26 is unique among all Chinese ground-launched missiles in that its payload is quickly field swappable, allowing for operational units to relatively rapidly switch between conventional and nuclear warheads. This feature has raised particular concerns about prelaunch warhead ambiguity concerning this system.¹² Like the DF-21, the DF-26 also has an anti-ship variant. U.S. intelligence leaked in 2023 identified a new missile, designated the DF-27, which is reported to be an HGV-equipped system exhibiting a slightly greater range than the DF-26.¹³ The third Chinese ground-launched, dual-capable system is the DF-17, the first operationally deployed medium-range HGV-equipped missile system. The DF-17 was revealed at a military parade in 2019, where state media described the system as conventional. Parts of the U.S. intelligence community, however, appear to assess that the DF-17 is dual capable.¹⁴

Beyond these dual-capable systems, China possesses a diverse array of short- and medium-range conventional ballistic and cruise missiles that nonetheless could be retrofitted to carry nuclear payloads. These include the short-range DF-15 and DF-16, each of which features multiple variants. Brigades operating both missiles are deployed within range of Taiwan and Japan’s southern Ryukyu Islands (including Okinawa). Notable cruise missile capabilities include two ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs): the 1,500-kilometer-range CJ-10/DH-10 and the 2,000-kilometer-range CJ-100/DF-100. China has an active research and development program for hypersonic cruise missiles,¹⁵ but no such missiles are known to be deployed. China also operates a variety of ground-launched coastal defense cruise missiles, including the 400-kilometer-range supersonic YJ-12.¹⁶

Anti-ship Ballistic Missiles

China has sought to develop ASBMs for more than a decade, with mixed results.¹⁷ These capabilities have received disproportionate attention in the United States due to their role in underpinning an anti-access strategy for China that seeks to hold at risk U.S. warships within the first and second island chains (see map 2). To date, it remains uncertain the extent to which China’s ASBM capabilities offer a militarily significant and proven capability. Colloquially dubbed “carrier-killer” missiles, China’s two ASBMs—the DF-21D and a DF-26 variant—were both flight tested against a moving live ship target in the South China Sea for the first time in 2020. Senior U.S. officials confirmed that such a test had taken place, but they did not confirm whether the test successfully demonstrated an ability for the ASBM’s RV to strike the target.¹⁸ Since these tests were carried out, further land-based testing of the missiles appeared to be underway, suggesting that the 2020 tests may not have been entirely assessed as successes. For instance, a facility first built in 2019 in the Chinese desert incorporating a mobile target that roughly resembles the dimensions of a U.S. Ford-class aircraft carrier saw renewed activity after the 2020 tests.¹⁹ ASBMs represent a formidable technical challenge due to the extremely high levels of precision required to strike a mobile target at sea and the consequent need to quickly update the missile with near-real-time positional data. Given the sustained concern expressed by U.S. analysts and officials about China’s ASBM capabilities, it would appear that these capabilities may have a deterrent effect on the United States in a conflict, even if technical shortcomings may limit performance.

Missiles in Chinese Strategy

Authoritative Chinese texts on military operations, including the 2020 edition of Science of Military Strategy, make multiple references to the roles of missiles in warfare. These include everything from “warning military strikes” with “relatively isolated” effects to large-scale “missile fire assaults” on targets including “reconnaissance and early warning capabilities and command and control capabilities.”²⁰ With regard to long-range conventional missiles, Science of Military Strategy (2020) further underscores their role in carrying out “a certain scale of conventional precision strikes against the enemy’s deep and important strategic targets.”²¹ The effectiveness of this approach depends on quantitative and qualitative factors, the text notes, including “the number, range, and accuracy of the missiles.”²² The text further underscores that the sufficiency of China’s conventional missile forces depends on quantitative factors more than qualitative ones due to the large number of “strategic and operational” military targets that would need to be held at risk in a local war.²³ Overall, missiles are seen as an essential component of pursuing “active defense,” the central strategic guideline of China’s broader defense strategy.²⁴

The primary conflict scenario informing these assessments concerns what Chinese texts refer to as “information-based local war” (or “informatized wars”).²⁵ China’s missile forces are not defined as the primary enabler of victory in such wars but instead are a source of “important support for winning” them.²⁶ This conflict scenario took on prominence in the 2014 strategic guidelines for the PLA, which also emphasized joint operations. China’s 2015 Military Strategy, a defense white paper released by the State Council Information Office, emphasizes the growing role of “long-range precision strikes” for the then PLA Second Artillery Corps.²⁷ Missiles, however, are treated as one among many components of national military power; the 2015 military strategy also emphasizes the role of “maritime military struggle” and the need for China to develop robust naval power.²⁸ Finally, given the Second Artillery Corps’ and the PLARF’s stewardship of China’s land-based strategic nuclear forces, dual-capable medium- and intermediate-range missiles, and conventional missiles, delineations between “theater” and “strategic” strikes are often blurred.

More specialized texts, such as The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (2004),²⁹ discuss missile operations, strategy, and deterrence in substantially greater detail—particularly as missiles relate to joint military operations. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns describes long-range precision strike weapons as “an important means and an indispensable operational force in our military’s joint operations for penetrating the enemy’s air defense system, striking the enemy’s in-depth targets, and seizing air and naval dominance in future local wars.”³⁰ It further emphasizes the importance of both qualitative and quantitative factors in achieving strategically significant effects with missiles, underscoring the need to penetrate air and missile defense systems while ensuring sufficiently high levels of precision to achieve “clear strike effects” against a range of military targets.³¹ PLA analysis of U.S. battlefield successes in the first Gulf War, during which precision-guided munitions featured prominently, prompted greater interest in the enabling role of robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities for targeting and damage assessment.³² As Chinese analysts have observed Russia’s large-scale use of nominally precise missiles against Ukrainian targets to relatively limited strategic effect in the Russia-Ukraine War, the importance of robust targeting and enabling technologies has likely been reinforced.

Beyond conventional capabilities, Chinese strategists see nuclear-armed missiles as contributing to general deterrence of conventional war escalation and adversary nuclear coercion, in line with long-standing Chinese concerns about possible nuclear coercion in limited crises, primarily by the United States.³³ China continues to adhere to a no-first-use nuclear declaratory policy, first articulated after its initial nuclear test in 1964.³⁴ U.S. analysts and officials routinely express doubt that China would adhere by its declared, no-first-use stance in a crises, however. U.S. analysts have drawn attention to the possibility of large-scale preemptive strikes early in a regional conflict by Chinese conventional missiles, aiming primarily at bases and other critical logistics nodes of a broader U.S. war effort.³⁵ Because of persistent doubts in the United States around China’s no-first-use pledge and its introduction of theater-range, dual-capable missiles, U.S. planners are concerned about the prospect of limited nuclear first use by China.³⁶ The substantial quantitative and qualitative increases in China’s missile arsenal between the mid-1990s and the late 2010s have underpinned these concerns, which remain pervasive and are partly driving ongoing U.S. investments in regional strike capabilities.

Beijing’s vast missile arsenal can project military power all along its periphery, including into disputed waters and islands in the East and South China Seas and, most importantly, into Taiwan.

China’s missile capabilities, however, are not solely directed toward U.S. capabilities and assets in the region. Beijing’s vast missile arsenal can project military power all along its periphery, including into disputed waters and islands in the East and South China Seas and, most importantly, into Taiwan. The central mission for the PLA remains the defense of China’s core interests, which include territorial integrity and sovereignty. As Beijing’s recent defense white papers note, the preeminent warfighting scenario for the PLA remains a conflict over Taiwan. Missiles have featured prominently in Chinese signaling over Taiwan. During the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995–1996, the Second Artillery Corps carried out two “large-scale conventional deterrence firing exercises,”³⁷ designed to signal Beijing’s ability to inflict damage against Taiwan-based targets. In August 2022, following a visit to the island by then U.S. speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, the PLARF launched multiple DF-15 missiles around Taiwan, overflying Taipei in the process.³⁸ In April 2023, the PLA claimed that it had simulated strikes on “key targets” in Taiwan; an animation released by official Chinese state media and attributed to the PLA’s Eastern Theater Command showed strikes from mainland-based ballistic and cruise missile units on Taiwanese cities.³⁹ Such strikes would likely be an important enabling component of a broader amphibious invasion campaign.

South Korea

South Korea possesses an advanced conventional missile force that is rapidly evolving. The origins of the country’s indigenous missile development efforts can be traced back to the early 1970s. These initial efforts coincided with the country’s clandestine efforts to pursue nuclear weapons under president Park Chung-hee (1962­–1979).⁴⁰ In the post–Cold War era, South Korea’s Agency for Defense Development has overseen a wide-ranging set of missile development projects. Land-attack missiles have been a prominent focus of these efforts. Beginning with the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013), South Korea’s independent missile capabilities assumed particular prominence in the country’s broader military planning efforts to counter the growing threat from North Korea, the country’s primary, nuclear-armed adversary.⁴¹ Under the conservative Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2017), South Korea broadly adapted its pursuit of missile capabilities to a new strategic approach built around three concepts: the Kill Chain, Korea Air and Missile Defense, and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR). This K3 suite of capabilities has been sustained since, including under the progressive Moon Jae-in administration (2017–2022), which temporarily rebranded each capability.⁴² The conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration, which took office in 2022, seeks to establish a new strategic command (K-STRATCOM) by 2024 that will oversee these capabilities.⁴³ The drivers of South Korea’s missile development efforts include deterrence of North Korea, hedging against future uncertainty, and, to a lesser extent for now, interest in buttressing its domestic defense industrial base, overall military power, and regional influence. Some analysts have described Seoul’s broader missile strategy as one of conventional counterforce and damage limitation against North Korea.⁴⁴

Dwindling Restraint: The U.S.-South Korea Missile Guidelines

An important constraint on South Korea’s indigenous missile capabilities was put in place at the end of the 1970s, amid broader U.S. efforts to ensure that its ally did not develop nuclear weapons after Seoul’s clandestine nuclear program was discovered and terminated. Originally articulated in a classified bilateral understanding between Washington and Seoul in 1979, South Korea agreed not to develop missiles capable of delivering payloads heavier than 500 kilograms to ranges in excess of 180 kilometers in exchange for technical assistance on missile technologies from the United States.⁴⁵ Over time, these guidelines were repeatedly updated and revised—sometimes in response to advances by North Korea. In 2001, the guidelines were first updated to increase the allowable level of missile development from the original 180 kilometers/500 kilograms to 300 kilometers/500 kilograms, thereby bringing both range and payload limits in line with Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Category I definitions. In 2012, the Lee administration lobbied the administration of U.S. president Barack Obama for further changes to the guidelines following prominent inter-Korean clashes in 2009 and 2010. The 2012 revision, like its 2001 predecessor, further increased the limitation to 800 kilometers/500 kilograms, thereby granting Seoul the ability to, for the first time, pursue missile systems capable of striking any target in North Korean territory from all conceivable launch points in South Korea. In 2017, the quickly advancing North Korean missile threat partially prompted further revisions to these guidelines, with the administration of U.S. president Donald Trump scrapping the payload limitations on South Korean missile development entirely while leaving the range limit of 800 kilometers intact. This was notionally a result of South Korean interest in developing heavy conventional payload missiles that could hold at risk certain deeply buried North Korean targets. Finally, in May 2021, during the first U.S.–South Korea summit meeting after the inauguration of President Joe Biden, the two sides announced that the missile guidelines had been totally scrapped, leaving South Korean missile development efforts fully unconstrained by externally agreed measures of restraint for the first time since 1979.

While range and payload constraints for ballistic missiles had been the primary features of the U.S.-South Korea bilateral missile guidelines, a secondary set of proscriptions limited Seoul’s use of solid propellants for SLVs. A July 2020 modification to the U.S.-South Korea missile guidelines removed these limits entirely, allowing Seoul for the first time to be capable of “developing, producing, and possessing” solid-propellant SLVs.⁴⁶ Because of common technologies involved in SLVs and long-range missiles, this modification to the guidelines might have generated concerns about a long-range South Korean missile program. But prior changes to the guidelines, including the payload limit removal in 2017, were more consequential to this end and manifested in new South Korean missile capabilities. Instead, Seoul’s interest in solid-fuel SLVs was motivated by the pursuit of more economic launchers for certain types of military reconnaissance satellites destined for low earth orbit. These satellites will have an important role in enabling South Korean military operations against North Korea by improving aggregate intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities available to Seoul. South Korea’s first successful test launch of a solid-fuel SLV took place in March 2022, the same month North Korea carried out its first full-range successful ICBM test on a lofted trajectory since 2017.⁴⁷ An official South Korean statement underscoring the significance of the SLV test noted that it was a “key milestone” in Seoul’s ongoing efforts to set up a “unilateral space-based surveillance system and bolster defense capability.”⁴⁸

Drivers of South Korean Missile Development

In the twenty-first century, South Korea’s domestic ground-based missile program has largely focused on the development of precise, conventionally armed, short-range ballistic missiles and a medium-range cruise missile, the Hyunmoo-3. Along with investments in improved intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, these missile capabilities are primarily envisaged as contributing to the deterrence of North Korean attacks and, should deterrence fail, a range of warfighting objectives. These objectives include, first, limiting damage from North Korean nuclear and conventional missiles and artillery through preemptive and counterbattery strikes and, second, retaliating against the North Korean leadership (including North Korean leader Kim Jong Un) if Pyongyang employs nuclear weapons. These final two objectives were crystallized under the Park Geun-hye administration as the Kill Chain (preemption) and KMPR (decapitation), respectively. These strategies continue to drive South Korea’s investments in missile capabilities and have been sustained by successive governments since.

South Korea’s missile capabilities have qualitatively improved alongside North Korea’s pursuit of ever-more-advanced nuclear and missile capabilities throughout the 2010s. By the end of the 2010s, Seoul’s missile capabilities had come to underpin what two scholars termed a “conventional counterforce” strategy, whereby South Korea was explicitly signaling its intention to destroy its nuclear-armed neighbor’s ability to employ and release nuclear weapons with non-nuclear weapons.⁴⁹ North Korea, too, has emphasized preemption in its own declaratory doctrine, raising crisis stability concerns on the Korean Peninsula; both countries have strong incentives to shoot first under certain circumstances and increasingly credible missile capabilities to make good on their plans in a crisis. Threats to kill the North Korean leadership, too, raise the risk of nuclear escalation—both deliberate and inadvertent—by Pyongyang.

Despite the apparent stability concerns stemming from both sides’ pursuit of ever-more-advanced conventional missile capabilities, numerous South Korean defense analysts underscore that Seoul’s pursuit of the K3 suite is necessary given the country’s non-nuclear status and the necessity of deterring North Korean attacks.⁵⁰ Despite its alliance with the United States, Seoul sees ample reason to continue investing in robust autonomous strike capabilities, partly concerned about the long-term reliability of the United States as an ally. Additionally, the United States has been supportive of Seoul’s K3 efforts. While some experts in South Korea may concede that these capabilities could contribute to a heightened risk of escalation with North Korea, they nevertheless underscore the country’s dire strategic environment in justifying Seoul’s investments in strike systems. After North Korea’s openly acknowledged pursuit of tactical nuclear weapons became apparent in 2021, this view has further ossified, particularly under the conservative Yoon administration. Moreover, many policymakers and analysts in Seoul largely reject the logic that South Korea’s capabilities could contribute to a spiral dynamic with North Korea; instead, they assert that effective demonstrations of an ability to preemptively limit damage from Pyongyang’s various conventional and nuclear-capable missile systems (Kill Chain) and an ability to deliver retaliatory strikes against the North Korean leadership (KMPR) will enhance deterrence.

South Korean progressives, who generally favor strategies of engagement toward North Korea, have nevertheless also supported these investments. Former president Moon not only sustained the K3 suite of capabilities but oversaw a substantial increase in defense spending compared to his two conservative predecessors.⁵¹ Even as the Moon administration pursed diplomacy with North Korea, South Korea’s defense spending saw year-on-year increases of 7 percent in 2018 and 8.2 percent in 2019 (see figure 4).⁵² An important driver of this spending was the stated interest of the Moon administration—consistent with earlier progressive administrations—in “the early takeover of wartime operational control.”⁵³ One of the peculiarities of the U.S.–South Korea alliance is that the United States would maintain wartime operational control (OPCON) of the military forces of both sides. The two countries have agreed to transfer wartime operational control to South Korea eventually, but this is now premised on the Conditions Based OPCON Transition Plan. At their forty-sixth Security Consultative Meeting in 2014, the two countries’ defense ministers agreed that the transition would take place when “critical ROK and Alliance military capabilities are secured and the security environment on the Korean Peninsula and the region is conducive to a stable OPCON transition.”⁵⁴ Seoul’s K3 systems are among the set of capabilities—including broader advances in command, control, communications, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—that will be critical to realizing a conditions-based OPCON transfer. South Korean progressives, while generally supportive of the alliance with the United States, seek OPCON transfer as a matter of national sovereignty. Separately, progressive leaders have also emphasized that defense acquisitions should befit South Korea’s geopolitical status, implying that prestige considerations have also been prominent.⁵⁵ For these reasons, continued investments in autonomous South Korean strike capabilities have persisted despite the presidential transition between conservatives and progressives.

Exports and Long-Term Hedging

Two final factors are prominent drivers of ongoing South Korean investments in missile technologies. The first concerns Seoul’s general ambitions to become a prominent defense exporter. While South Korea is a member of the MTCR and thereby commits—albeit in a politically rather than legally binding manner—to exercise a “strong presumption of denial” concerning transfers of complete longer-range missile systems capable of delivering payloads in excess of 500 kilograms to more than 300 kilometers, its defense industry has otherwise stepped up efforts to develop shorter-range systems that are competitive globally. The K239 Chunmoo, a launcher for sub-MTCR-Category-1-class missiles, for instance, is being procured by the Polish military.⁵⁶ Seoul has also undertaken efforts to substitute certain imported missile capabilities with indigenous designs that may be partially reverse engineered. A prominent example is a new air-to-ground cruise missile that was first demonstrated by the South Korean Ministry of National Defense in late 2021. That missile physically resembles and appeared to perform similarly to the German-Swedish Taurus KEPD 350K air-launched cruise missile that Seoul first obtained in 2016.⁵⁷

A final driver of missile investments in Seoul pertains to long-term hedging in an uncertain security environment in Northeast Asia. For instance, in September 2021, South Korea revealed a new supersonic anti-ship cruise missile⁵⁸—a capability that is far in excess of what would be qualitatively necessary to hold North Korean surface ships at risk. This capability was widely perceived as one that South Korea could bring to bear in a potential future naval clash with China,⁵⁹ a growing concern for both progressives and conservatives in Seoul, and possibly even with Japan. In September 2021, South Korea also became the first non-nuclear state in the world to develop and test a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), the Hyunmoo-4-4, and the only state to deploy conventional SLBMs.⁶⁰ While Seoul’s nominal reason for this capability is to render its KMPR strategy more credible by communicating to Pyongyang that it would have the means to retaliate against North Korea’s leadership even if its ground-launched missile capabilities were destroyed in the course of nuclear strikes, the Hyunmoo-4-4 has raised nuclear hedging concerns. While a conventional SLBM may supplement the KMPR strategy, it would be a natural delivery system for potential nuclear payloads in the future. Amid growing public and elite interest in nuclear weapons acquisition amid North Korea’s quickly advancing missile capabilities,⁶¹ Seoul will be well positioned insofar as delivery systems are concerned should it seek to procure nuclear weapons in the future.

North Korea

Although it is among the most resource-constrained states in East Asia, North Korea possesses a formidable array of ballistic and cruise missiles, many of which are capable of delivering nuclear payloads. While the country’s initial efforts at procuring a missile arsenal began with reverse engineering rudimentary Scud-type liquid-fueled ballistic missiles in the late 1970s,⁶² Pyongyang today possesses ballistic and cruise missiles of all ranges, deliverable via a variety of mobile platforms. Beginning in the mid-2010s, North Korea’s missile capabilities saw substantial qualitative leaps. Between 2015 and 2020, North Korea crossed several important missile development thresholds, demonstrating its first intermediate- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, SLBMs, endoatmospheric maneuvering ballistic missiles, and advanced active and passive missile guidance capabilities.⁶³ In January 2021, North Korean leader Kim outlined a wide-ranging set of military modernization objectives at the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, a prominent political event in the North Korean political system.⁶⁴ The objectives included a substantial focus on regional delivery systems for “tactical” nuclear weapons.⁶⁵ For example, he called for the development and testing of hypersonic boost-glide systems and long-range cruise missiles, among other capabilities. This military modernization, presented under a broader five-year national plan, remains underway and is expected to last until at least early 2026. North Korea’s missile capabilities—especially in conjunction with nuclear weapons—have contributed sharply to increasing threat perceptions in Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Pyongyang relies on its nuclear forces as an important offset capability to cope with the qualitatively superior conventional forces fielded by the United States and its allies.

Drivers of North Korean Missile Development

A primary driver of North Korea’s missile development efforts over several decades has been its interest in developing a reliable and survivable means of delivery for nuclear weapons. As the world’s newest nuclear-armed state, North Korea has opted for ground-launched, road-mobile ballistic missiles as its preferred mode of delivery for nuclear weapons across all ranges—paralleling its choice for deep conventional strikes. Pyongyang has traditionally justified its pursuit of nuclear weapons as a means of existential insurance against what it perceives as long-standing hostility by the United States. Though the pursuit of credible nuclear deterrence has been the primary driver of North Korea’s missile development efforts more recently, Pyongyang has also put priority on enhanced conventional missile capabilities, primarily with short- and medium-range systems, for warfighting ends below the nuclear threshold if necessary. Indeed, North Korea’s pursuit of missile technology predates its efforts to seek nuclear weapons. However, between the mid-1980s and 2017, North Korean missile flight-testing primarily focused on developing credible strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems; this effort coincided with six nuclear explosive tests conducted between October 2006 and September 2017 and the test launching of long-range missiles of varying designs. In 2017, North Korea for the first time demonstrated on lofted trajectories two types of liquid-propellant-based ICBMs, the Hwasong-14 and the Hwasong-15. Each of these missiles incorporated liquid propellant engines first flight-tested in an intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-12.

To offset its long-standing qualitative conventional military disadvantages against U.S. and South Korean forces, North Korea has reserved the right to use nuclear weapons first. A 2013 law, adopted by the country’s Supreme People’s Assembly (a parliament-like body), codified two roles for North Korea’s nuclear weapons: to “deter” general war and, should deterrence fail, “repel” an invasion of its territory. Kim has repeated this framing, including prominently during an April 2022 military parade.⁶⁶ An update to the 2013 law,⁶⁷ promulgated in 2022, reaffirmed these roles for nuclear weapons while outlining five sets of conditions under which Pyongyang could resort to the first use of nuclear weapons (see box 1).

The conditions, as described in the official English translation of the updated law released by North Korea, are sufficiently expansive to allow for nuclear first use under a range of scenarios. Pyongyang has signaled through its missile tests that it would likely employ nuclear weapons against targets such as ports, airfields, and command and control nodes, to degrade U.S. expeditionary military operations and otherwise blunt the warfighting capability of the U.S.-South Korea alliance. The same updated law in 2022 noted that North Korea would automatically and immediately release its nuclear weapons should its leadership or command and control systems be deliberately attacked.

Dual-Capable Missiles and Tactical Nuclear Weapons

At the Eighth Party Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, Kim for the first time declared an intent to develop “tactical” nuclear weapons. No universal definition of tactical nuclear weapons exists, and Kim did not specify what he meant at the time.⁶⁸ April 2022 was the first time North Korea demonstrated a delivery system that it ascribed a tactical nuclear delivery role to; the tested system was a close-range ballistic missile with a demonstrated range of 110 kilometers. Later that year, North Korea carried out a spate of missile launches that it described as operational exercises for units charged with tactical nuclear operations. These launches featured a spectrum of short-range ballistic missiles, medium-range cruise missiles, and one intermediate-range ballistic missile, suggesting that Pyongyang may be ascribing a tactical role to any missiles capable of ranging targets in the Indo-Pacific theater, including the U.S. territory of Guam (see map 3).

Tactical nuclear weapons in the traditional sense (lower-yield weapons on short-range delivery systems) would be a logical pursuit for a state that has sought to offset its conventional military inferiorities vis-à-vis its adversaries by resorting to credible threats of early nuclear use, as North Korea has. Nevertheless, the pursuit of these weapons, which will broadly coincide with the quantitative growth of North Korea’s strategic nuclear warhead stockpile, introduces new risks. For instance, while North Korea has to date maintained assertive command over its nuclear forces and favored negative controls (for instance, procedures and technical solutions to ensure that nuclear weapons are never used without proper authorization), tactical nuclear weapons are likely to introduce strong incentives for the country’s leadership to consider the delegation of nuclear use authority—if not in peacetime, then in a crisis.⁶⁹ This, combined with an emphasis on conventional counterforce targeting and potential preemption by Pyongyang’s adversaries, could lead to tremendous incentives to use nuclear weapons early in a crisis. Furthermore, while North Korea is thought to currently store its nuclear warheads at a single site,⁷⁰ tactical nuclear weapons deployment could lead to incentives to disperse warheads, including at known missile operating bases around the country. Because these bases would likely feature commingled nuclear and conventional missiles and support vehicles, any attacks on such sites could be misperceived by the North Korean leadership as the start of a broader, disarming counterforce strike, generating strong incentives for nuclear use. While North Korea may disperse and conceal its nuclear forces in anticipation of a conventional war, a general lack of strategic situational awareness capabilities would still give Pyongyang reason to fear whether its capabilities would remain sufficiently survivable amid efforts by the United States and its allies to attrite its missile forces. These developments have accelerated efforts in South Korea and, more recently, in Japan to develop plans and capabilities to target North Korean missile launchers and associated infrastructure.

Focus on Survivability and Responsiveness

Trend lines in North Korea’s missile development efforts point to a focus on improving prelaunch and postlaunch survivability and the general responsiveness of its missile forces. These imperatives are a direct result of Pyongyang’s own perceived conventional military weaknesses, its broader lack of strategic situational awareness capabilities, and concerns about the possibility of conventional preemptive attacks by South Korea and the United States (and increasingly Japan). With regard to survivability, Pyongyang has advanced its missile capabilities in several ways. The preponderance of its short-range missile testing since 2017, for instance, has involved solid-propellant missiles. Compared to Pyongyang’s older arsenal of liquid-propellant, Scud-type missiles, these newer missiles are manufactured with the propellant-oxidizer mix cast directly into the airframe, obviating the need for fueling prior to launch. This reduces the need for supporting fueling vehicles, thereby decreasing the signature of field-deployed mobile missile units on overhead optical satellites, and simultaneously removes the need for a missile to remain stationary while being fueled, which makes them vulnerable to a preemptive strike if detected. North Korea has also started to base short-range missiles on rail-mobile launchers and emphasized the promptness of its ability to launch missiles in a crisis.

Trend lines in North Korea’s missile development efforts point to a focus on improving prelaunch and postlaunch survivability and the general responsiveness of its missile forces.

To further improve prelaunch survivability, North Korea has started to manufacture at scale tracked chassis missile launchers that are capable of carrying out launches from unpaved roads and entirely off-road locations. This ostensibly complicates tracking and targeting for its adversaries, who can no longer rely on tracking missile launchers along the relatively modest paved road networks in the country. Pyongyang has also expanded its extensive network of underground facilities, tunnels, and drive-through missile shelters to complicate adversary tracking of its mobile missile launchers. In 2022, North Korea also indicated that it would begin basing certain missiles in inland lakes, though its actual adoption of such a basing mode has yet to be confirmed.⁷¹

A second set of survivability improvements concerns the defeat of U.S. and allied missile defense capabilities. While the quantitative expansion of North Korea’s missile forces poses a significant challenge for U.S. and allied theater missile defense capabilities, which are at risk of being overwhelmed with saturation strikes and salvo attacks, Pyongyang is also investing in qualitative means of stressing and defeating missile defenses. Efforts in this area have included investments in maneuvering missile payloads, including HGVs, MaRVs, and cruise missiles. North Korea has also devoted particular attention to endoatmospheric, aeroballistic short-range ballistic missiles that may exploit a perceived gap between the altitudinal limits of certain types of missile defense interceptors known to have been deployed on South Korean soil.⁷² These investments are, in part, a response to sustained investment in missile defense capabilities by Japan, South Korea, and the United States. 

Australia

Australia has not traditionally sought or maintained long-range precision strike missile capabilities, but this has begun to change. Intensifying threat perceptions concerning China have been a primary driver of greater Australian interest in procuring advanced missile capabilities as part of a broader strategic adjustment in the country’s defense policy toward the twin objectives of assuring territorial defense while maintaining a power projection capability. The shifting approach to defense policymaking in Canberra is best seen in the changes that resulted between the country’s 2016 Defence White Paper⁷³ and its 2020 Defence Strategic Update,⁷⁴ the latter of which recognized a growing “risk of state-on-state conflict” and articulated a need for Australia to pursue a force capable of “[projecting] military power to shape our environment, deter actions against [Australian] interests and, when required, respond with effective military force.” These aspirations were further refined in Australia’s 2023 Defence Strategic Review.⁷⁵ While Australian defense spending over the last decade has remained within 1.7 and 2.0 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), it has grown in absolute terms (see figure 5).⁷⁶

Pursuant to the 1951 Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), Australia is party to a collective defense arrangement with the United States and, as a result, maintains close interoperability and consultations with Washington on defense matters.⁷⁷ In 2011, as the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia was beginning to take shape, Australia and the United States announced a series of Force Posture Initiatives, which were codified in a bilateral treaty in 2014.⁷⁸ Pursuant to the treaty, the two sides established a bilateral Force Posture Working Group to coordinate activities and advance cooperation on a range of matters. In September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced a trilateral defense-industrial partnership known as AUKUS that includes plans for cooperation on defense technologies.⁷⁹ While much attention has focused on how the AUKUS partnership gives Australia the capability to operate nuclear-powered attack submarines, it also includes considerable provisions to facilitate the procurement and indigenous production of long-range strike systems, including hypersonic weapons.⁸⁰

Accelerating Readiness

In April 2022, the government of former Australian prime minister Scott Morrison approved a plan for 3.5 billion Australian dollars ($2.2 billion) to accelerate the “acquisition of improved weapon capabilities for the Australian Defence Force.”⁸¹ Pursuant to the 2020 Defence Strategic Update, the specific missile capabilities this sought to fund included the U.S.-made 1,000-kilometer-range Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range (JASSM-ER); its anti-ship version, the 370-kilometer Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM); and the dual-mode (anti-ship and land-attack), 250-kilometer Naval Strike Missile (NSM). Peter Dutton, the former Australian defense minister, said at the time that these investments were necessary for Australia due to changes in the strategic environment, requiring the Australian Defence Force to “be able to hold potential adversary forces and infrastructure at risk from a greater distance.”⁸² JASSM-ER/LRASM will arm the Australian FA-18F Super Hornet fighter aircraft and, eventually, the F-35A Lightning II fighter aircraft. The NSM will replace existing Harpoon anti-ship missiles on ANZAC-class frigates and Hobart-class destroyers. The Australian Department of Defence notes that the NSM would represent a “significant enhancement” of capability over the Harpoon due to the fact that it would “more than [double] the current maritime strike range of our frigates and destroyers.” Australia will also purchase U.S.-made 1,600+ kilometer Tomahawk Block IV and Block V land-attack cruise missiles for its Hobart-class destroyers, enabling its “maritime assets to strike land targets at greater distances, with better precision.”⁸³

Finally, Canberra seeks new land-based precision strike missiles, which will be tasked with “destroying, neutralising and supressing [sic] diverse targets from over 400 km.”⁸⁴ This requirement will be met by current and future increments of the U.S.-made Precision Strike Missile (PrSM). Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update also notes that the country will seek “self-reliant geospatial-information and intelligence capability,” in part to “support precision guided weapons.”⁸⁵ Despite a political transition in 2022 from a Liberal Party government to a Labor Party one under Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, Australia’s broader defense orientation has remained unchanged—as has Canberra’s enthusiasm for coordinating with the United Kingdom and the United States under the AUKUS arrangement.

Apart from its own investments in long-range strike capabilities, Australia is substantially enhancing its bilateral cooperation with the United States under the Force Posture Initiatives. A particularly notable initiative in this area is a bilateral plan to support new U.S. long-range bomber support facilities in northern Australia, the establishment of which has been ongoing since 2020. (U.S. bombers have trained with the Royal Australian Air Force and spent more time deployed to Australian bases.⁸⁶) Australia’s strategic location in the Indo-Pacific has been a particular draw for the United States, which has attempted to improve the survivability of its forward-deployed bomber forces in Asia by seeking additional basing facilities beyond those available in Guam and Hawaii in the Pacific and Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean. New and dedicated facilities in Australia to fuel bombers, maintain conventional munitions stocks, conduct maintenance, and house personnel would improve the flexibility of U.S. bomber operations in the Indo-Pacific. Notably, unlike the U.S. territory of Guam, the city of Darwin in northern Australia likely falls out of the range of Chinese ground-launched, theater-range strike systems such as the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. Australia’s geographic advantage may be blunted as China proceeds to develop potentially longer-range conventional strike systems, nearing if not exceeding the traditional intercontinental-range threshold of 5,500 kilometers, but Australian and U.S. military planners may believe that the added targeting requirements for China may enhance general deterrence.

New and dedicated facilities in Australia to fuel bombers, maintain conventional munitions stocks, conduct maintenance, and house personnel would improve the flexibility of U.S. bomber operations in the Indo-Pacific.

Under AUKUS specifically, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States are planning to initiate new forms of defense-industrial cooperation on hypersonic missiles, though in September 2023 specifics remained sparse. Cooperation in this area between Washington and Canberra dates back to the late 2000s, when Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Group and the U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory began collaborating through the Hypersonic International Flight Research Experimentation (HIFiRE) program. HIFiRE, which also included the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration at one point, was not explicitly oriented around missile development, however, and focused generally on the applicability of hypersonic bodies for “next generation aeronautical systems.”⁸⁷ Building on HIFiRE, the two countries announced the Southern Cross Integrated Flight Research Experiment (SCIFiRE) initiative in 2020, focused on developing air-breathing hypersonic technologies.⁸⁸ (HIFiRE saw limited experimentation with scramjet technologies.⁸⁹) Testing pursuant to these programs has taken place at Australia’s Woomera test range in the country’s south.⁹⁰

An April 2022 summit statement by the three AUKUS leaders noted that they have committed to “commence new trilateral cooperation on hypersonics and counter-hypersonics.”⁹¹ While the United States is considerably more advanced among the three partners insofar as research and development for hypersonic missiles is concerned, Australia has developed a substantial base of independent scientific and technical talent in this area since the 2010s and operates seven hypersonic wind tunnels. A trilateral AUKUS hypersonic missile program may still be derived from existing or planned U.S. systems, however. Following the collapse of the 1987 INF Treaty, the United States has accelerated efforts to develop and deploy new theater-range hypersonic missiles. Apart from hypersonic missiles, Australia has committed resources to at least one such U.S. “post-INF” missile system; Canberra, under the Morrison government, committed funds to codevelop a new increment of the U.S. Army’s PrSM.⁹² This agreement was cinched the month before AUKUS was formally announced in September 2021, indicating that U.S.-Australia cooperative activities on joint missile development predated the newer flagship trilateral partnership.

A final notable component of Australia’s future plans related to missiles—though not necessarily long-range missiles—concerns the 2020 Defense Strategic Update’s defense enterprise goals.⁹³ Specifically, Canberra has started the process of establishing a sovereign capability to manufacture advanced, guided weapons and explosive ordnance. After the announcement of the AUKUS partnership, Canberra further accelerated 1 billion Australian dollars ($640 million) for this sovereign enterprise capability. An additional 1.5 billion Australian dollars ($960 million) was announced for this purpose in 2023. The strategic logic driving this investment concerns Australia’s vulnerability to outside suppliers and partners to sustain its stocks of munitions that could be quickly expended in a high-intensity interstate conventional war. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the country is working to establish a sovereign capability to quickly replenish munitions stocks. Over the long term, this sovereign manufacturing capability, combined with Canberra’s expanding talent and knowledge base, could enable the manufacture of new long-range missiles. According to Australian officials involved with the Sovereign Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance (GWEO) Enterprise, this initiative will remain highly dependent on access to intellectual property and data from the United States, which is not assured but may be more likely pursuant to the AUKUS partnership.⁹⁴ Australian officials have also cited the intensity of munitions requirements observed in the Russia-Ukraine war as another motivator for continuing investments in GWEO.⁹⁵

Japan

Among the U.S. treaty allies examined in this study, Japan is unique in its constitutional constraints on pursuing certain military capabilities. The country’s constitution, drafted under U.S. occupation in the aftermath of World War II, saw Tokyo “forever renounce war” as a means of pursuing its national interests.⁹⁶ Article Nine of the constitution proscribes Tokyo’s pursuit of “war potential” and forswears the “right of belligerency.” While the precise meaning of Article Nine has been reinterpreted to allow for the gradual expansion of Japan’s defense capabilities and for Tokyo to play a more active—and even expeditionary—role within the context of the U.S.-Japan treaty alliance, these constitutional restraints have continued to influence debates in Japan on the types of capabilities that the country can legally procure. The dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has ruled Japan for most of its postwar history, has seen prominent political leaders seek to reinterpret these constitutional restraints in pursuit of something akin to a normalized defense posture. The late prime minister Abe Shinzo was among the most prominent of these leaders; as Japan’s longest-serving postwar prime minister over two nonconsecutive terms, Abe oversaw substantial changes to Japan’s defense posture. Abe’s second stint, from December 2012 to September 2020, saw military reforms, defense white papers that articulated Tokyo’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis China in no uncertain terms, and prominent adjustments to the defense guidelines that underpin the U.S.-Japan alliance.⁹⁷ In the aftermath of Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine and amid sharply rising threat perceptions in Tokyo concerning both China and North Korea, Tokyo promulgated an updated National Security Strategy and a National Defense Strategy that represent nothing short of a sea change in postwar Japanese defense policy and plans.

Long-range land-attack missiles, by their very nature, are generally seen as offensive capabilities, designed to destroy targets at range. As a result, they traditionally have been deemed as incompatible with Japan’s constitutional constraints. A common analogy used to describe the role of Japan’s military capabilities in the context of its alliance with the United States was to juxtapose Tokyo’s capabilities as the “shield” to Washington’s “spear.” In other words, Japan would pursue exclusively defensive capabilities while enabling U.S. expeditionary military operations in Northeast Asia.⁹⁸ Japanese officials note, however, that this was due to a policy choice by Tokyo and not a legal determination. Therefore, Tokyo’s landmark 2022 National Security Strategy was able to endorse a call for new, longer-range missile capabilities to hold at risk adversary missile launchers and related infrastructure. In the post–Cold War era, legislative changes opened the door for Japan’s Self-Defense Forces to join United Nations peacekeeping operations overseas and support U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The primary drivers of Japan’s move toward openly pursuing long-range strike capabilities in the 2020s are growing geopolitical friction with China and serious concerns about the threat posed by North Korea’s increasingly sophisticated and large nuclear and conventional missile forces. The latter was explicitly centered in Japanese debates in the late 2010s and early 2020s on acquiring long-range strike capabilities, but concerns about China have also driven interest. For instance, Japan has moved anti-ship and anti-air missiles to four islands along its southwestern Ryukyu chain to contribute to the defense of the Senkaku Islands, which Tokyo administers but Beijing claims and calls the Diaoyu Islands. Some of these capabilities may also contribute to a Taiwan contingency,⁹⁹ which is increasingly driving Japanese defense policy and featured prominently in the domestic debates leading up to the 2022 revised National Security Strategy. The United States is also involved in augmenting strike operations along the Ryukyu Islands;¹⁰⁰ a new U.S. marine littoral regiment will become operational in the region by the mid-2020s and will field uncrewed Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS) launchers armed with NSMs.¹⁰¹ The regiment will deploy initially on Okinawa but may expand to other islands.¹⁰²

A Debate on “Strike” Capabilities

Japan began to consider the security consequences of North Korea’s burgeoning missile programs in the early 1990s. The real wake-up call for Tokyo came in 1998, when Pyongyang flew the Taepodong-1 satellite launch technology demonstrator over Japan. The overflight precipitated a sharp interest in Tokyo in missile defense. Following that demonstration, Japan and the United States began to cooperate with unprecedented closeness in developing missile defense interceptors and systems, including the SM-3 Cooperative Development Project to develop the SM-3 Block IIA variant interceptor. Faced with a growing missile threat in its neighborhood and nevertheless constrained by its constitution, Japan largely looked to missile defenses as a solution. In 2017, unprecedented qualitative breakthroughs from North Korea further shocked Japan. In August and September that year, Pyongyang flew intermediate-range Hwasong-12 ballistic missiles over Japan, marking the first time Japanese territory had been overflown with missiles explicitly characterized as designed to carry nuclear weapons. These launches prompted a serious study in Japan of whether its existing missile defense architecture, which by then had grown to include a range of capabilities on land and at sea, was fit for the task of managing North Korea’s evolving missile arsenal. In December 2017, the Abe administration finalized plans to pursue two fixed Aegis Ashore missile defense sites that could add to Tokyo’s existing missile defense coverage.¹⁰³ After domestic political difficulties concerning the locations of these sites and public concerns about the consequences of spent interceptor stages potentially landing on populated Japanese territory, the Abe administration canceled these deployment plans in June 2020.¹⁰⁴ The overall costs of the system—and of missile defense in general as a long-term plan for coping with the threat posed by North Korean missiles—also factored into government decisionmaking in the lead-up to the decision to scrap the two sites.¹⁰⁵

As the plan to deploy Aegis Ashore sites moved forward between 2017 and 2020, parts of the LDP were counseling the Abe administration to consider alternatives to missile defense, namely strike capabilities. As early as March 2017, prominent LDP members, citing a “new level of threat” from North Korea, prompted Abe to consider Japan’s pursuit of “our own capability of striking back at an enemy base, with cruise missiles for instance, to further improve deterrence and response as part of the Japan-U.S. alliance.”¹⁰⁶ Onodera Itsunori, who from 2012 to 2014 served as Abe’s first defense minister during his second nonconsecutive prime ministerial term, led that intra-LDP council. Onodera served again as Abe’s defense minister from 2017 to 2018, overseeing the final decision to move ahead with Aegis Ashore.¹⁰⁷ Following the cancellation of the Aegis Ashore procurement plan in June 2020, Abe requested that Onodera lead another LDP policy committee to study alternative missile defeat plans, including the strike capability idea that the former defense minister had championed in early 2017. Like in early 2017, the committee returned with a recommendation to seek long-range strike capabilities: “Our country needs to consider ways to strengthen deterrence, including having the capability to halt ballistic missile attacks within the territory of our adversaries,” the proposal document said.¹⁰⁸ The committee was careful in its choice of verb, opting for the considerably neutral “halt” and eschewing terms that could imply offensive intent, such as “attack.” The constitutionality matter was largely treated as settled within the LDP, as long as the intent was to forestall an “imminent” attack. The precedent here was a 1956 statement by former Japanese prime minister Hatoyama Ichiro, who had once said that Japan could take “minimum measures unavoidably necessary,” when no other means were available, to forestall an “imminent illegal invasion.”¹⁰⁹ Speaking before the Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature, Hatoyama also expressed the view that “I cannot believe that it is the constitution’s intention for us to sit and wait for our own destruction.” Between Hatoyama’s 1956 statements and the 2020 Onodera committee recommendations, several private government-commissioned studies and remarks by public figures, including Abe, hinted at long-running interest in Japan in acquiring such capabilities—even prior to North Korea’s first nuclear test in October 2006.¹¹⁰

These Japanese debates, particularly between 2017 and 2022, were often presented in international media as concerning a “strike capability.” Officially, Japanese experts and politicians preferred to allude to a “counter-attack capability” (or counter-strike capability), implicitly indicating that Tokyo would only seek to carry out deep strikes against an adversary’s territory once an attack on Japan was underway. This would nominally foreclose the possibility of preemptive attacks, whereby Japan would launch strikes prior to actually suffering an adversary’s strikes. As the plans proceeded in 2022, amid Prime Minister Kishida Fumio’s efforts to update Japan’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, the LDP addressed this issue with its more restrained coalition partner, the Komeito party. October 2022 consultations between the two parties, however, revealed reluctance on the part of the LDP to fully clarify the Japanese government’s interpretation of what the initiation of an adversary’s attack might mean—with the intention of augmenting deterrence through manifesting ambiguity in an adversary’s decisionmaking calculus.¹¹¹ Komeito, however, sought to limit the range of scenarios in which Japan could carry out strikes as well as the targets of such strikes. A notable divergence between the two concerned whether “command and control functions” should be acceptable targets for Japanese strikes.¹¹² The final 2022 National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy leave this matter explicitly unaddressed, preserving a certain degree of ambiguity that may be deliberate.

Notably, Japan’s internal debates on acquiring these capabilities accelerated largely in parallel to the disintegration of the INF Treaty (discussed in a subsequent chapter). Despite the possibility of a newly unconstrained U.S. missile arsenal becoming available for basing on Japanese soil at some point in the mid-to-late 2020s, Japanese defense experts and officials appeared to favor an independent capability, with some seeing a compelling military logic to Japan’s possession of such weapons and others simply seeing U.S. missiles on Japanese soil as a bridge too far, politically speaking.¹¹³ During the Abe-era consultations on missile defeat strategies, including missile defense and strike capabilities, prominent Japanese defense officials indicated that Tokyo should be prepared to hedge against an uncertain future—both in terms of regional threat perceptions and in terms of the U.S.-Japan alliance—by building capabilities that would allow it to, in effect, limit damage and attrite an adversary’s missile forces with long-range strike weapons of its own.¹¹⁴ The acquisition of such capabilities could not only augment deterrence of attacks on Japanese territory but also limit the scope of damage to Japan if deterrence failed. Furthermore, Japanese officials appeared to believe that such capabilities would be largely complementary to U.S. expeditionary and strike capabilities in the region, including possible conventional missile systems that the United States might deploy to Asia in the aftermath of the INF Treaty. Finally, though rarely expressed in public, Japanese officials bore concerns about the reliability of the United States as an ally—particularly under Trump’s erratic presidency between 2017 and 2021. In the course of 2020 debates on Japan’s strike capability, Nakatani Gen, a former LDP defense minister, alluded to these concerns, noting that Tokyo “cannot take for granted that the United States will retaliate if we are attacked,” and consequently Japan must “enhance deterrence by developing our own retaliatory capability.”¹¹⁵

Pursuit of New Capabilities

Despite its constitutional constraints, Japan does possess notable missile capabilities—although none that were deployed as of October 2023 were capable of carrying out deep strikes on targets within China or North Korea from Japanese territory. The most prominent indigenous, ground-based Japanese missile system is the 180-kilometer-range Type 88/SSM-1 anti-ship cruise missile system. The Type 12, an improvement to the Type 88, was introduced in 2015 and features an advanced guidance package and greater precision alongside a modest range extension to 200 kilometers. Press reports prior to the finalization of the Kishida administration’s National Security Strategy suggested that the Japanese Ministry of Defense planned to authorize research, development, testing, and evaluation of longer-range land-attack variants of the Type 12, with the ceiling on possible range extensions surpassing 1,000 kilometers.¹¹⁶ This was ultimately endorsed by the government, but the technical work necessary to extend the range of these missiles may take until early 2026.¹¹⁷ Japan’s 2021 defense budget included 33.5 billion yen ($306 million in 2021 U.S. dollars) for the development of an extended-range Type 12 variant.¹¹⁸ Press reports have also underscored that the Japanese Ministry of Defense is exploring the possibility of developing hypersonic land-attack missiles capable of holding at risk targets up to 3,000 kilometers away, which would allow deep strikes into much of mainland China.¹¹⁹ If based on Ishigaki Island, which is 400 kilometers southwest of Okinawa on the first island chain, such missiles would be able to range all known PLARF brigades with the exception of Brigade 646 in Xinjiang and China’s new fixed ICBM silo fields. These missiles, if pursued, are to be developed by the mid-2030s. Range extension efforts will likely be paired with efforts to base these cruise missiles on new launch platforms, including fighter aircraft and surface ships of the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.¹²⁰ Tokyo is also likely to explore the emplacement of long-range cruise missiles on submarines.¹²¹ The Japanese government has earmarked 5 trillion yen ($37 billion in 2022 U.S. dollars) for the procurement of new long-range missiles between the 2023 and 2027 fiscal years.¹²² Japanese analysts who support these efforts underscore trends in regional missile proliferation in Northeast Asia, particularly the rapid growth of Chinese, North Korean, and even South Korean missiles capable of ranging in excess of a few hundred kilometers.¹²³ Beyond its indigenous capabilities, Japan’s 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines and Medium Term Defense Program endorsed the procurement of the U.S.-made JASSM/LRASM air-launched cruise missiles and the Norwegian-U.S.-made air-launched Joint Strike Missile.¹²⁴

The United States recently has been supportive of Japanese efforts to acquire long-range strike capabilities.

The United States recently has been supportive of Japanese efforts to acquire long-range strike capabilities. Within the confines of the alliance, Japan’s missile capabilities are being increasingly integrated with U.S. airpower. For instance, the two sides have carried out joint exercises to study how Japanese anti-ship missile units in the first island chain could create a favorable operational environment for U.S. airpower.¹²⁵ In the aftermath of the United States leaving the INF Treaty, some U.S. officials also encouraged Tokyo to potentially host or procure new U.S. missiles. Marshall Billingslea, the former U.S. presidential envoy for arms control in the Trump administration, for instance, described the U.S. Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile as “exactly the kind of defensive capability that countries such as Japan will want and will need for the future.”¹²⁶ While the United States and Japan did not formally consult on the basing of U.S. missiles on Japanese soil immediately after the INF Treaty disintegrated, Trump administration officials raised the issue, underscoring in particular China’s growing missile capabilities.¹²⁷ Despite that, since the end of the INF Treaty, Japan’s determination to buttress its own strike capabilities has only expanded—with little added interest in the possibility of hosting U.S. missiles.¹²⁸ Procuring U.S. missiles, however, is part of Tokyo’s plans. As part of its broader defense spending outlays through the 2027 fiscal year (see figure 6), Japan plans to spend more than $2 billion on U.S. Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles for emplacement on certain Maritime Self-Defense Force ships.¹²⁹ As of 2023, Tokyo’s plans included the procurement of 400 Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles.¹³⁰

Taiwan

Taiwan has maintained a long-standing interest in the pursuit of ballistic and cruise missiles (see figure 7), with initial efforts at indigenously developing missile technology dating back to the 1970s. In the interest of preserving stability in the Taiwan Strait and global nonproliferation, the United States viewed a potential ballistic missile arsenal in Taiwan as destabilizing, particularly in the 1970s and 1980s, and discouraged its development.¹³¹ Taipei thereafter largely focused its efforts on cruise missiles—especially those that could be considered as defensive platforms against a Chinese amphibious invasion attempt, such as anti-ship cruise missiles—and surface-to-air missiles, which received the preponderance of Taiwanese research and development efforts as a result. The Hsiung Feng I/IA anti-ship cruise missiles and Tien-Kung 1 surface-to-air missile system were two early Taiwanese missile systems, each precipitating a series of anti-ship cruise missiles and surface-to-air missiles that remain relevant to this day. The first Hsiung Feng I anti-ship cruise missile test was carried out on July 27, 1975.¹³² Beginning in the late-1960s, Taiwan started flight-testing shorter-range Kung Feng-series rocket artillery systems.

Like its reservations about South Korea’s pursuit of long-range delivery systems in the 1970s, Washington was particularly concerned about Taiwanese interest in ballistic missile technologies due to concerns that Taipei might pursue nuclear weapons. Taiwan aborted its clandestine effort at building nuclear weapons in 1988 under U.S. pressure,¹³³ and it further abandoned efforts to build a nearly 1,000-kilometer-range ballistic missile system under the Tien Ma program.¹³⁴ Despite this, Taiwan has sustained a substantial base of domestic knowledge on missile development, focused on cruise missiles.

Emphasis on Offense in Taiwanese Missile Strategy

The primary driver of Taiwanese investments in missiles has been the long-perceived threat of an invasion of its territory from the People’s Republic of China. As China’s own ballistic and cruise missile capabilities expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, Taiwan largely saw a need to keep pace with its own capabilities—particularly those that would be able deliver tactical and strategic effects against fixed and mobile targets in Chinese territory. Despite U.S. encouragement during this time to invest in missile defenses, Taiwanese policymakers almost universally saw offensive missile capabilities as the most cost-effective means to deter Beijing.¹³⁵ By the 1990s, Taiwan’s substantial investments in indigenous missile research and development efforts and growing expertise likely also buttressed Taipei’s belief that it could sustain and scale an indigenous missile force without necessarily relying on the United States. Following the U.S. normalization of diplomatic relations with China in 1979, Taiwan ceased to benefit from the formal, treaty-codified U.S. extended deterrence assurances that had been in place since 1954.¹³⁶ In 1979, the U.S. Congress enacted the Taiwan Relations Act, which has since governed the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan and included a commitment to “make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity.”¹³⁷ The Ronald Reagan administration extended six assurances to Taipei that included a commitment to continue arms sales to Taiwan indefinitely and without consultation with Beijing.¹³⁸

Despite these continuing U.S. statements of support, policymakers in Taipei still saw a necessity to continue investing in missile capabilities. The locus of indigenous expertise in missile technologies and missile development in Taiwan largely rests with the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). NCSIST undertakes defense research and development activities relating to a range of technologies with defense applications. Through the 1990s, while interest in ballistic missile defenses appeared to grow around the world following U.S. claims concerning the role of Patriot missile defense systems in the first Gulf War, Taipei remained skeptical of the cost effectiveness of missile defense. (U.S. claims concerning the performance of Patriot against Scuds in that war were later shown to have been significantly exaggerated.¹³⁹) In 1995, then Taiwanese defense minister Chiang Chung-ling underscored another component of Taipei’s reasoning about the value of missile systems, publicly hinting before Taiwanese legislators that such capabilities could contribute to a campaign of preemption against Chinese missile launchers: “Undoubtedly, the best defense strategy is to attack . . . the best defense measure is to destroy the [Chinese] M-class missiles before they are launched.”¹⁴⁰ At the time, this was an unusually transparent and authoritative statement from a Taiwanese official on the purpose of Taipei’s continuing investments in missile capabilities. Taiwan had maintained substantial opacity regarding its missile development efforts at NCSIST; this opacity persisted for decades and has only recently begun to give way to greater transparency. Less than a year after Chiang’s public remarks, in the course of what would come to be known as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s Second Artillery Corps fired DF-15 ballistic missiles during live-fire exercises, spotlighting Beijing’s missile capabilities and reaffirming Taiwanese threat perceptions.¹⁴¹ In the aftermath of the crisis, Taiwan expanded its missile-related research and development activities, which included efforts to convert anti-ship cruise missiles into land-attack cruise missiles.¹⁴²

In the twenty-five years since the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, China’s ballistic and cruise missile arsenal and its conventional military capabilities more generally have grown substantially. Since the 2016 election in Taiwan, when Democratic Progressive Party candidate Tsai Ing-wen became president, cross-strait relations have declined precipitously. China views Tsai and her party as insufficiently committed to Beijing’s interpretation of the One China principle and as positively disposed toward formal independence for Taiwan. Moreover, intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China has largely shed Washington of its earlier encouragement of restraint concerning the pursuit of strike capabilities by Taipei. Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the United States has continued to support robust defensive arms sales to Taiwan and has actively encouraged Taipei to pursue capabilities that could contribute to deterrence by denial of a Chinese amphibious invasion through the pursuit of anti-ship cruise missiles, among other weapon systems—but not dedicated land-attack systems. Even before these developments, by the end of the 2010s, analyses of the cross-strait military balance emphasized Taiwan’s limited ability to cope with the capabilities China could bring to bear in an invasion scenario.¹⁴³

Ongoing Investments in Missiles

Due to Taipei’s general restraint in the pursuit of ballistic missile technologies, most of its deployed missiles and missiles under development are cruise missiles of varying speed and sophistication. The most prominent of Taiwan’s operational missiles is the Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack cruise missile, which features a 600-kilometer range, giving it the ability to hold at risk targets well within mainland China (primarily Fujian Province, but also parts of Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Jiangxi Provinces). The Hsiung Feng IIE is the primary deployed long-range surface-attack missile; another missile, known as Yun Feng (discussed later), is under development and will allow Taiwan to hold at risk targets deeper in mainland China. The bulk of Taiwan’s other indigenous operational missiles are anti-ship cruise missiles and air-to-surface cruise missiles. These include both the Hsiung Feng II and Hsiung Feng III anti-ship cruise missiles, each of which is a close-range missile (120–150 kilometers), and the air-launched Wan Chien cruise missile, with a slightly longer, 240-kilometer range. The Wan Chien’s range can be practically extended if its launch platform, the F-CK-1 C/D Ching-kuo fighter, is able to leave Taiwanese airspace in the direction of mainland China. (This airspace would be highly contested in times of conflict, and Taiwanese fighters would be vulnerable to ship- and shore-based air defenses.) Taiwan’s lone, known deployed ballistic missile capability is in the form of the solid-propellant, short-range Tien Chi missile, which is thought to be derived from a surface-to-air missile.¹⁴⁴ Sources vary in range assessments of the Tien Chi, but it is probable that the missile could deliver a light, conventional high-explosive payload to around 300 kilometers,¹⁴⁵ allowing for strikes on mainland Chinese targets near the coast from forward island bases. 

Taiwan has traditionally been concerned about the survivability of its own missile force, particularly as China’s long-range precision strike capabilities have grown in the post–Cold War era. Taipei has generally been hesitant to publicize details about its missile capabilities. Until recently, images of prominent Taiwanese missile systems, such as the Hsiung Feng III, were not released by official sources. At one point, Taiwan explored the possibility of disguising Hsiung Feng IIE mobile launchers as commercial delivery vehicles—a decision that one Taiwanese military official would later describe to the press as “idiotic” and “embarrassing” following disclosures by open-source analysts.¹⁴⁶ Taipei has also been reluctant to confirm the existence of certain missile programs. For instance, for years, rumors swirled about a Taiwanese program, known as Yun Feng, to develop a long-range surface-to-surface missile designed to hold at risk targets deep within China. The Taiwanese military confirmed the existence of such a program in October 2021 for the first time.¹⁴⁷ The Yun Feng is not a ballistic missile system but a probable ramjet-equipped, supersonic land-attack cruise missile; it may be partially derived from the Hsiung Feng III. Taiwanese press reported that a series of Yun Feng launches took place in April 2020, but this was not officially confirmed.¹⁴⁸ In June 2022, You Si-kun, the president of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan, alluded to the ability of the Yun Feng missile to strike Beijing, implying that the missile could play the role of retaliating against China’s senior political leadership in the context of an invasion.¹⁴⁹ You alluded to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, juxtaposing Taiwan’s apparent ability to strike deep within China with Ukraine’s relatively more limited strike capabilities.¹⁵⁰ Since 2021, Taiwan has substantially deepened its investments in missile systems, including through the passage of a supplementary defense budget in 2021.¹⁵¹ According to a senior Taiwanese official, Taiwan’s indigenous missile production is expected to surpass 1,000 missiles across all range classes in 2023.¹⁵²

Beyond its indigenous capabilities, Taiwan continues to source a number of precision strike systems from the United States. Washington has continued to approve the sale of various missile systems to Taipei. In October 2020, the United States announced an intention to sell 135 270-kilometer AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile Expanded Response (SLAM-ER);¹⁵³ eleven High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) M142 launchers,¹⁵⁴ along with associated munitions; and 400 124-kilometer RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Block II Surface Launched dual-mode anti-ship and land-attack missiles.¹⁵⁵ These were in addition to a package of Block I-92F shoulder-fired surface-to-air Stinger missiles and Block I-92F Stinger Fly-to-Buy missiles approved in July 2019. Additional U.S.-Taiwan cooperation may result in the joint production of U.S. weapons in Taiwan, according to officially uncorroborated press reports,¹⁵⁶ although the United States is unlikely to authorize production capabilities that would meaningfully assist Taiwan’s ability to produce ballistic or cruise missiles. U.S. concern over the possible unintended transfer of intellectual property or leaks of classified information relating to certain missile systems could preclude the finalization of such an agreement. Nevertheless, U.S. interest in coproducing missiles in Taiwan in the 2020s underscores the substantial shifts in Washington’s prior encouragement of restraint in Taipei, largely as a function of growing geopolitical rifts with Beijing and concerns about a deliberate invasion of Taiwan. U.S. lawmakers are further considering the acceleration of arms sales to Taiwan, including the provision of anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-tank missile systems, through the foreign military financing program.¹⁵⁷ 

Notes

¹ For background on the history and bureaucratic drivers of China’s missile development, see David C. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” in Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed. Philip C. Saunders et al. (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2019), 393–394.

² Dual-capable missiles are systems intended for the delivery of both nuclear and conventional payloads, with both types of warheads available. Conventional missiles are inherently capable of delivering nuclear weapons if appropriate warheads are available and manufactured. For more on payloads and ambiguity, see Acton, “Is It a Nuke?”

³ No Chinese cruise missiles are currently known to be intended for use with nuclear warheads.

⁴ “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.

⁵ M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s ‘World-Class Military’ Ambitions: Origins and Implications,” Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (January 2, 2020): 85–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2020.1735850.

⁶ Xiu Ma, PLA Rocket Force Organization (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute/Blue Path Labs, 2021), 4.

⁷ This is an organizational term that does not correspond to distinct individual facilities.

⁸ Bases 67, 68, and 69 are involved in training, support, logistics, testing, and nuclear warhead management.

⁹ PLARF base locations and compositions have been constructed from open sources by various analysts outside of China. See Jeffrey Lewis, David Joel La Boon, and Decker Eveleth, “China’s Growing Missile Arsenal and the Risk of a ‘Taiwan Missile Crisis’,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 18, 2020, https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/chinas-growing-missile-arsenal-and-the-risk-of-a-taiwan-missile-crisis.

¹⁰ “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.

¹¹ “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” U.S. Department of Defense, 2022, 167, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

¹² Acton, “Is It a Nuke?,” 31–33.

¹³ Zuzanna Gwadera, “Intelligence Leak Reveals China’s Successful Test of a New Hypersonic Missile,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 18, 2023, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2023/05/intelligence-leak-reveals-chinas-successful-test-of-a-new-hypersonic-missile/.

¹⁴ Ankit Panda, “Introducing the DF-17: China’s Newly Tested Ballistic Missile Armed With a Hypersonic Glide Vehicle,” December 28, 2017, 17, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle. The DF-17 was described as a “strategic nuclear system” by a senior U.S. military official in congressional testimony in 2020. See Charles A. Richard, “Statement of Charles A. Richard, Commander, United States Strategic Command, Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services,” February 13, 2020, 4, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Richard_02-13-20.pdf.

¹⁵ Xuanzun Liu, “China’s Hypersonic Cruise Missile Sees Technological Breakthrough: Reports,” Global Times, June 8, 2020, https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1190877.shtml.

¹⁶ For a survey of China’s cruise missile development efforts, see Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, “A Potent Vector: Assessing Chinese Cruise Missile Developments,” Joint Force Quarterly 75 (September 30, 2014), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/577568/a-potent-vector-assessing-chinese-cruise-missile-developments/.

¹⁷ Andrew S. Erickson, Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Development: Drivers, Trajectories, and Strategies (Brookings Institution Press and Jamestown Foundation, 2013), https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1dgn67n.

¹⁸ “#HFX2020: Admiral Philip Davidson,” YouTube video, posted by “Halifax International Security Forum,” November 20, 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7q5mvRJyGrw. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2021 report on Chinese military capabilities further specified that the tests in 2020 were against “a moving target in the South China Sea.” See “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,” Office of the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 2021, 61.

¹⁹ H. I. Sutton and Sam LaGrone, “China Builds Missile Targets Shaped Like U.S. Aircraft Carrier, Destroyers in Remote Desert,” USNI News, November 7, 2021, https://news.usni.org/2021/11/07/china-builds-missile-targets-shaped-like-u-s-aircraft-carrier-destroyers-in-remote-desert.

²⁰ “2020 Science of Military Strategy,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, January 26, 2022, 138, 271, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy.

²¹ “2020 Science of Military Strategy,” 385.

²² “2020 Science of Military Strategy,” 385.

²³ “2020 Science of Military Strategy,” 389.

²⁴ M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019), 166.

²⁵ Fravel, Active Defense, 230–234.

²⁶ “2020 Science of Military Strategy,” 385.

²⁷ “Full Text: China’s Military Strategy,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, May 26, 2015, http://www.china.org.cn/china/2015-05/26/content_35661433.htm.

²⁸ M. Taylor Fravel, “China’s New Military Strategy: ‘Winning Informationized Local Wars,’” Jamestown Foundation, July 2, 2015, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-military-strategy-winning-informationized-local-wars.

²⁹ This text is formally classified, but it was leaked to sources outside China and has since been unofficially translated into English.

³⁰ PLA Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns (Beijing: PLA Press, 2004), 318.

³¹ PLA Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 317.

³² PLA Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 317–335.

³³ PLA Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 272; and Rosemary J. Foot, “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict,” International Security 13, no. 3 (1988): 92–112, https://doi.org/10.2307/2538737.

³⁴ “Statement by Peking on Nuclear Test,” New York Times, October 17, 1964, https://www.nytimes.com/1964/10/17/archives/statement-by-peking-on-nuclear-test.html.

³⁵ Thomas Shugart, “First Strike: China’s Missile Threat to U.S. Bases in Asia,” June 28, 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/first-strike-chinas-missile-threat-to-u-s-bases-to-asia; and Eric Heginbotham et al., “Chinese Attacks on U.S. Air Bases in Asia: An Assessment of Relative Capabilities, 1996–2017,” RAND Corporation, September 14, 2015, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9858z2.html

³⁶ Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War With the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (April 1, 2017): 50–92, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.

³⁷ PLA Second Artillery Corps, The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns, 54.

³⁸ Yimou Lee and Sarah Wu, “Furious China Fires Missiles Near Taiwan in Drills After Pelosi Visit,” Reuters, August 5, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/suspected-drones-over-taiwan-cyber-attacks-after-pelosi-visit-2022-08-04.

³⁹ Helen Davidson, “China Ends Military Drills After Simulating Strikes on Taiwan,” The Guardian, April 10, 2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/10/china-simulates-strikes-on-taiwan-from-aircraft-carriers-as-drills-enter-third-day. The animation was shared on Twitter by the Global Times, among other Chinese outlets. See Global Times (@globaltimesnews), “WATCH: A computer generated animation by the PLA Eastern Theater Command shows its mock joint precision strikes on the island of Taiwan on Sunday,” Twitter post and video, April 9, 2023, 3:49 a.m., https://twitter.com/globaltimesnews/status/1644970821977526272.

⁴⁰ Nicholas Seltzer, “Baekgom: The Development of South Korea’s First Ballistic Missile,” Nonproliferation Review 26, no. 3–4 (May 4, 2019): 289–327, https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2019.1659541.

⁴¹ Peter Crail, “South Korea Unveils New Missile,” Arms Control Today, May 2012, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012-05/south-korea-unveils-new-missile.

⁴² These concepts were temporarily rebranded during the Moon Jae-in administration amid diplomacy with North Korea. The Kill Chain was renamed Strategic Target Strike, Korea Air and Missile Defense became Korea Missile Defense, and KMPR became Overwhelming Response. The Yoon Seok-yeol administration has since reversed these changes to the original naming conventions.

⁴³ Daehan Lee, “South Korea to Create New Command That Would Control Strategic Weapons,” Defense News, July 11, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2022/07/11/south-korea-to-create-new-command-that-would-control-strategic-weapons.

⁴⁴ Ian Bowers and Henrik Stålhane Hiim, “Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas: South Korea’s Deterrence Strategy and Stability on the Korean Peninsula,” International Security 45, no. 3 (January 1, 2021): 7–39, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00399; and Manseok Lee and Hyeongpil Ham, “South Korea’s Conventional Forces Buildup: The Search for Strategic Stability,” War on the Rocks, April 16, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/south-koreas-conventional-forces-buildup-the-search-for-strategic-stability.

⁴⁵ Daniel A. Pinkston, “The New South Korean Missile Guidelines and Future Prospects for Regional Stability,” International Crisis Group, October 25, 2012, https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/new-south-korean-missile-guidelines-and-future-prospects-regional-stability.

⁴⁶ Ankit Panda, “Solid Ambitions: The U.S.–South Korea Missile Guidelines and Space Launchers,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 25, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/08/25/solid-ambitions-u.s.-south-korea-missile-guidelines-and-space-launchers-pub-82557.

⁴⁷ Josh Smith, “S.Korea Says It Successfully Test-Fired First Solid-Fuel Space Rocket,” Reuters, March 30, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/skorea-says-it-successfully-test-fired-first-solid-fuel-space-rocket-2022-03-30.

⁴⁸ Smith, “S.Korea Says It Successfully Test-Fired.”

⁴⁹ Bowers and Hiim, “Conventional Counterforce Dilemmas.”

⁵⁰ This view was expressed by multiple South Korean defense analysts interviewed by the author in Seoul in 2021 and 2022.

⁵¹ Lami Kim, “A Hawkish Dove? President Moon Jae-in and South Korea’s Military Buildup,” War on the Rocks, September 15, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/09/a-hawkish-dove-president-moon-jae-in-and-south-koreas-military-buildup.

⁵² “Defense Budget,” Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea, accessed November 2, 2022, https://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mndEN/subview.jsp?id=mndEN_030900000000.

⁵³ “Address by President Moon Jae-in on the 69th Armed Forces Day,” Korea.net, September 28, 2017, https://www.korea.net/Government/Briefing-Room/Presidential-Speeches/view?articleId=149818&pageIndex=1.

⁵⁴ “Joint Communiqué: The 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” U.S. Department of Defense, October 24, 2014, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/46th_SCM_Joint_Communique.pdf.

⁵⁵ Sang-ho Song, “Moon Stresses Need for Defense Capabilities Befitting S. Korea’s Geopolitical Position,” Yonhap, December 26, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20211226000700325.

⁵⁶ Jaroslaw Adamowski, “Poland to Buy Hundreds of SKorean Chunmoo Multiple-Rocket Launchers,” Defense News, October 14, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2022/10/14/poland-to-buy-hundreds-of-s-korean-chunmoo-multiple-rocket-launchers.

⁵⁷ Mark Cazalet et al., “South Korea Testing Several New Missiles Amid Tensions With Pyongyang,” Janes.com, September 15, 2021, https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/south-korea-testing-several-new-missiles-amid-tensions-with-pyongyang.

⁵⁸ Soo-hyang Choi, “S. Korea Develops Supersonic Cruise Missile Amid Tensions With N. Korea,” Yonhap, September 15, 2021, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20210915010951325.

⁵⁹ Daehan Lee, “South Korea Reveals Plans to Deter China via A2/AD,” Naval News, January 12, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/01/south-korea-reveals-plans-to-deter-china-via-a2-ad.

⁶⁰ Hyonhee Shin, “S.Korea Says It Successfully Tests Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile,” Reuters, September 15, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/skorea-successfully-tests-submarine-launched-ballistic-missile-blue-house-2021-09-15.

⁶¹ Surveys from 2021 found that 71 percent of the South Korean public supported the development of an independent nuclear deterrent. See Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim, “Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 21, 2022), https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons; and 기자김상진, “여당 북핵대응특위 ‘핵무장 비밀 프로젝트 추진해야,’” 중앙일보, November 24, 2022, https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25120044.

⁶² Ankit Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb: Survival and Deterrence in North Korea (Oxford University Press, 2020), 138–140.

⁶³ Ankit Panda, “North Korea’s New KN19 Coastal Defense Cruise Missile: More Than Meets the Eye,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2017, 19, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/north-koreas-new-kn19-coastal-defense-cruise-missile-more-than-meets-the-eye; and Ankit Panda, “Introducing the KN21, North Korea’s New Take on Its Oldest Ballistic Missile,” The Diplomat, September 14, 2017, 21, https://thediplomat.com/2017/09/introducing-the-kn21-north-koreas-new-take-on-its-oldest-ballistic-missile.

⁶⁴ “On Report Made by Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un at Eighth Party Congress of WPK,” National Committee on North Korea, January 25, 2021, https://www.ncnk.org/resources/publications/kju_8th_party_congress_speech_summary.pdf/file_view.

⁶⁵ Ankit Panda, “A Call to Arms: Kim Jong Un and the Tactical Bomb,” Washington Quarterly 44, no. 3 (July 3, 2021): 8–9, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2021.1969089.

⁶⁶ Josh Smith and Hyonhee Shin, “Analysis: North Korea Signals Expansive Mission for Its Nuclear Weapons,” Reuters, April 27, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-signals-expansive-mission-its-nuclear-weapons-2022-04-27.

⁶⁷ “DPRK’s Law on Policy of Nuclear Forces Promulgated,” KCNA Watch, September 9, 2022, https://kcnawatch.org/newstream/1662721725-307939464/dprk%E2%80%99s-law-on-policy-of-nuclear-forces-promulgated.

⁶⁸ Panda, “A Call to Arms.”

⁶⁹ Vipin Narang and Ankit Panda, “Command and Control in North Korea: What a Nuclear Launch Might Look Like,” War on the Rocks, September 15, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/09/command-and-control-in-north-korea-what-a-nuclear-launch-might-look-like.

⁷⁰ Panda, Kim Jong Un and the Bomb, 245.

⁷¹ Jeongmin Kim, “North Korea’s Lake-Launched Missile Complicates Seoul’s Defense Plans: Experts,” NK News, October 11, 2022, https://www.nknews.org/2022/10/north-koreas-lake-launched-missile-complicates-seouls-defense-plans-experts.

⁷² For instance, many of North Korea’s endoatmospheric aeroballistic missiles have exhibited glide trajectories within the 40-to-60-kilometer range. The Patriot Advanced Capability-3 interceptor may lack an ability to engage targets effectively over 40 kilometers, based on open sources, and the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system interceptor has an engagement “floor” of 50 kilometers. See Brian Kim, “South Korea to Buy More Patriot Missiles, Upgrade Launchers,” Defense News, June 6, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2022/06/06/south-korea-to-buy-more-patriot-missiles-upgrade-launchers; and Michael Elleman and Michael J Zagurek, “THAAD: What It Can and Can’t Do,” 38 North, March 10, 2016, 13, https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/2016-03-10_THAAD-What-It-Can-and-Cant-Do.pdf. The author is grateful to the late Michael Elleman for raising this point during a private exchange in 2019.

⁷³ Australian Department of Defence, “2016 Defence White Paper,” June 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2016-defence-white-paper.

⁷⁴ Australian Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update,” July 1, 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2020-11/2020_Defence_Strategic_Update.pdf.

⁷⁵ Australian Department of Defence, “Defence Strategic Review 2023,” 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review.

⁷⁶ SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

⁷⁷ “The Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS Treaty), 1951,” Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State, accessed October 21, 2022, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus. Since 1986, New Zealand and the United States have no longer maintained the formal ANZUS collective defense arrangement. For background, see Daniel Mulhall, “New Zealand and the Demise of ANZUS: Alliance Politics and Small-Power Idealism,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 2, no. 3 (1987): 61–77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/30002014.

⁷⁸ “The Force Posture Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, August 12, 2014, https://www.info.dfat.gov.au/Info/Treaties/Treaties.nsf/AllDocIDs/6441A500816C2902CA257D38001DB33D.

⁷⁹ “Joint Leaders Statement on AUKUS,” White House, September 15, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/15/joint-leaders-statement-on-aukus.

⁸⁰ Malcolm Davis, “AUKUS: Looking Beyond the Submarines,” The Strategist, November 4, 2021, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/aukus-looking-beyond-the-submarines; and “AUKUS Leaders’ Level Statement,” White House, April 5, 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/04/05/aukus-leaders-level-statement.

⁸¹ Peter Dutton, “$3.5 Billion to Accelerate Missile Strike Capabilities for the ADF,” Australian Department of Defence, April 5, 2022, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2022-04-05/35-billion-accelerate-missile-strike-capabilities-adf.

⁸² Dutton, “$3.5 Billion to Accelerate Missile Strike Capabilities for the ADF.”

⁸³ Scott Morrison and Peter Dutton, “Joint Media Statement: Australia to Pursue Nuclear-Powered Submarines Through New Trilateral Enhanced Security Partnership | Defence Ministers,” Australian Department of Defence, September 16, 2021, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2021-09-16/joint-media-statement-australia-pursue-nuclear-powered-submarines-through-new-trilateral-enhanced-security-partnership; and Mallory Shelbourne, “Congress Notified of Potential $895M Tomahawk Sale to Australia,” USNI News, March 16, 2023, https://news.usni.org/2023/03/16/congress-notified-of-potential-895m-tomahawk-sale-to-australia.

⁸⁴ Morrison and Dutton, “Joint Media Statement: Australia to Pursue Nuclear-Powered Submarines.”

⁸⁵ Australian Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update,” 40.

⁸⁶ “U.S. Air Force Airmen, B-52H Bombers Arrive in Australia to Train With Australian Counterparts,” U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, March 30, 2018, https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/1481370/us-air-force-airmen-b-52h-bombers-arrive-in-australia-to-train-with-australian.

⁸⁷ “HIFiRE Program,” Defence Science and Technology Group, July 12, 2013, https://www.dst.defence.gov.au/partnership/hifire-program.

⁸⁸ “Department of Defense Announces New Allied Prototyping Initiative Effort With Australia to Continue Partnership in Developing Air Breathing Hypersonic Vehicles,” U.S. Department of Defense, November 30, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2429061/department-of-defense-announces-new-allied-prototyping-initiative-effort-with-a.

⁸⁹ Kathy Barnstorff, “HIFiRE Scramjet Research Flight Will Advance Hypersonic Technology,” U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, May 10, 2012, http://www.nasa.gov/topics/aeronautics/features/hifire.html.

⁹⁰ Greg Waldron, “US, Australia Conclude Secretive Hypersonic Flight Series,” Flight Global, July 12, 2017, https://www.flightglobal.com/us-australia-conclude-secretive-hypersonic-flight-series/124771.article.

⁹¹ “AUKUS Leaders’ Level Statement,” White House.

⁹² GlobalData, “Australian Interest in Lockheed Martin’s PrSM Cements Future HIMARS Purchase,” Army Technology, August 24, 2021, https://www.army-technology.com/comment/australia-lockheed-martin-prsm.

⁹³ Australian Department of Defence, “2020 Defence Strategic Update,” 40.

⁹⁴ “3 December 2021 - GWEO Briefing by Major General Andrew Bottrell,” 19:00–22:00 YouTube video, posted by “DTCDefenseIndustry,” December 9, 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x3M_VUCzNh4.

⁹⁵ Author’s private correspondence with an Australian Defence Department official.

⁹⁶ Adam P. Liff, “Policy by Other Means: Collective Self-Defense and the Politics of Japan’s Postwar Constitutional Reinterpretations,” Asia Policy, no. 24 (2017): 139–172, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26403212.

⁹⁷ Ankit Panda, “US, Japan Agree to New Defense Guidelines,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/04/us-japan-agree-to-new-defense-guidelines.

⁹⁸ Michael Green, “The Challenges of Managing U.S.-Japan Security Relations After the Cold War,” in Curtis, ed., New Perspectives on U.S.-Japan Relations.

⁹⁹ Louise Watt, “Japan Missile Plan on Ishigaki Island Helps Boost Taiwan Defense,” Nikkei Asia, August 20, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Japan-missile-plan-on-Ishigaki-island-helps-boost-Taiwan-defense.

¹⁰⁰ “Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR),” United States Marine Corps Flagship, January 11, 2023, https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/2708146/marine-littoral-regiment-mlr.

¹⁰¹ The NSM is a sub-200-kilometer-range system. For background, see Peter Ong, “Latest Details on the USMC’s NMESIS and Long Range USV,” Naval News, June 22, 2022, https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/06/latest-details-on-the-usmcs-nmesis-and-long-range-usv.

¹⁰² Lee Ferran and Ashley Roque, “Japan Signs Off on Marines Plan for New Littoral ‘Stand-In’ Group in Okinawa,” Breaking Defense, January 12, 2023, https://breakingdefense.sites.breakingmedia.com/2023/01/japan-signs-off-on-marines-plan-for-new-littoral-stand-in-group-in-okinawa.

¹⁰³ Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan to Buy Aegis Ashore Missile Defense Systems,” Defense News, December 19, 2017, https://www.defensenews.com/land/2017/12/19/japan-to-buy-aegis-ashore-missile-defense-systems.

¹⁰⁴ “Japan Aegis Ashore Missile Defense System Deployment Scrapped: Kono,” Kyodo News, June 25, 2020, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/06/5cd95541475a-breaking-news-japan-scraps-plan-to-deploy-aegis-ashore-missile-defense-system-kono.html.

¹⁰⁵ Author’s interviews with Japanese defense officials in Tokyo in November 2019.

¹⁰⁶ Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Ruling Party Urges Strike Ability Amid N. Korea Threat,” Associated Press, March 30, 2017, https://apnews.com/article/c5369a9db8d448ffb5e7c56e0d9c3630.

¹⁰⁷ Associated Press, “Japan’s Defence Chief Seeks Local Support to Deploy a Missile Shield,” South China Morning Post, June 23, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2152113/japans-defence-chief-seeks-local-support-deploy-land-based.

¹⁰⁸ Reuters Staff, “Pacifist Japan Ruling Party Proposes Strike Capability to Halt Missile Attacks,” Reuters, July 31, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-idUSKCN24W09C.

¹⁰⁹ Corey Wallace, “Japan and Foreign Territory Strike: Debate, Deterrence, and Defense Strength,” Journal Of Global Strategic Studies 1, no. 2 (December 29, 2021): 37, https://doi.org/10.36859/jgss.v1i2.846.

¹¹⁰ James L. Schoff and David Song, “Five Things to Know About Japan’s Possible Acquisition of Strike Capability,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, August 14, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/08/14/five-things-to-know-about-japan-s-possible-acquisition-of-strike-capability-pub-72710.

¹¹¹ Mina Pollmann, “Japan’s Ruling Coalition Debates Future Defense Policies,” The Diplomat, October 24, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/japans-ruling-coalition-debates-future-defense-policies.

¹¹² “Japan’s Counterstrike Capability Proposal to Ban Preemptive Attacks,” Kyodo News, November 13, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/11/6b7dbca186b7-japans-counterstrike-capability-proposal-to-ban-preemptive-attacks.html.

¹¹³ Ankit Panda, “The US and Japan After the INF Treaty,” The Diplomat, December 1, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/the-us-and-japan-after-the-inf-treaty.

¹¹⁴ Author’s conversations with Japanese defense experts and officials in November 2019.

¹¹⁵ Corey Wallace, “The Future of Japan’s Defense Is More Complicated Than It Looks,” Tokyo Review, September 14, 2020, https://www.tokyoreview.net/2020/09/the-future-of-japans-defense-is-more-complicated-than-it-looks. Privately, Japanese experts and officials have expressed similar views during interviews and conversations with the author.

¹¹⁶ “Japan Starts to Extend Range of Its Missiles to Over 1,000 Km,” Nikkei Asia, December 1, 2021, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Japan-starts-to-extend-range-of-its-missiles-to-over-1-000-km.

¹¹⁷ Alastair Gale and Chieko Tsuneoka, “Japan to Spend Billions on U.S. Tomahawk Missiles in Military Buildup,” Wall Street Journal, December 23, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/japan-to-spend-billions-on-u-s-tomahawk-missiles-in-military-buildup-11671784716.

¹¹⁸ “Japan Eyes Developing Standoff Missiles for Vessels, Fighter Jets,” Mainichi Daily News, June 5, 2021, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20210605/p2a/00m/0na/008000c.

¹¹⁹ “Japan to Develop 3,000-Km Long-Range Missiles, Deploy in 2030s, Kyodo Reports,” Reuters, December 31, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/japan-develop-3000-km-long-range-missiles-deploy-2030s-kyodo-2022-12-31.

¹²⁰ Sam LaGrone, “Japanese MoD Releases New Details on Ballistic Missile Defense Ships,” USNI News, December 28, 2022, https://news.usni.org/2022/12/27/japanese-mod-releases-details-on-ballistic-missile-defense-ships.

¹²¹ “長射程ミサイル、潜水艦発射型を検討 反撃手段で防衛省,” 日本経済新聞, November 28, 2022, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA24B6E0U2A121C2000000.

¹²² “Japan to Earmark 5 Tril. Yen for Long-Range Missiles Over 5 Years,” Kyodo News, December 7, 2022, https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2022/12/83976c4f0bc8-japan-to-earmark-5-tril-yen-for-long-range-missiles-over-5-years.html.

¹²³ Based on the author’s conversations with certain Japanese security analysts.

¹²⁴ “Medium Term Defense Program (FY 2019–FY 2023),” Japan Ministry of Defense, 2018, https://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/11591426/www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/chuki_seibi31-35_e.pdf.

¹²⁵ Alastair Gale, “Rising Threat From China Pushes U.S. and Japan to Deepen Military Cooperation,” Wall Street Journal, January 2, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-threat-from-china-pushes-u-s-and-japan-to-deepen-military-cooperation-11641138867.

¹²⁶ Ryo Nakamura, “US Considers Midrange Missile Deployment in Asia to Counter China,” Nikkei Asia, August 15, 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Editor-s-Picks/Interview/US-considers-midrange-missile-deployment-in-Asia-to-counter-China.

¹²⁷ “Press Briefing With Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control and Lt. Gen. Thomas Bussiere, Deputy Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command,” U.S. Department of State, August 18, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/press-briefing-with-ambassador-marshall-billingslea-u-s-special-presidential-envoy-for-arms-control-and-lt-gen-thomas-bussiere-deputy-commander-of-the-u-s-strategic-command.

¹²⁸ The U.S. Marine Corps operates HIMARS launchers equipped with short-range missiles in Japan, but no longer-range U.S. missile systems are deployed on Japanese soil.

¹²⁹ Gale and Tsuneoka, “Japan to Spend Billions on U.S. Tomahawk Missiles in Military Buildup.”

¹³⁰ Mari Yamaguchi, “Japan Signs $2.8 Billion Deals for Long-Range Missile Development,” Defense News, April 11, 2023, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2023/04/11/japan-signs-28-billion-deals-for-long-range-missile-development.

¹³¹ Dennis M. Gormley, Missile Contagion: Cruise Missile Proliferation and the Threat to International Security, reprint edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010), 43–44.

¹³² “History,” NCSIST, accessed November 13, 2022, https://www.ncsist.org.tw/eng/csistdup/aboutus/History.aspx#Map5.

¹³³ David Albright and Andrea Stricker, Taiwan’s Former Nuclear Weapons Program: Nuclear Weapons On-Demand (Washington, DC: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform, 2018).

¹³⁴ Gormley, Missile Contagion, 43. The exact date of the Tien Ma program’s cancellation is not known. News reports through the 1990s and early 2000s refer to the Tien Ma program, but most authoritative accounts describe it having been terminated in the 1980s.

¹³⁵ Gormley, Missile Contagion, 43.

¹³⁶ Hungdah Chiu, “Certain Legal Aspects of Recognizing the People’s Republic of China,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 11, no.2 (1979): 33, https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol11/iss2/7.

¹³⁷ Clement J. Zablocki, “H.R.2479 - 96th Congress (1979-1980): Taiwan Relations Act,” legislation, April 10, 1979, 1979/1980, https://www.congress.gov/bill/96th-congress/house-bill/2479?s=1&r=7.

¹³⁸ “Declassified Cables: Taiwan Arms Sales & Six Assurances (1982),” American Institute in Taiwan, March 30, 2022, https://www.ait.org.tw/declassified-cables-taiwan-arms-sales-six-assurances-1982.

¹³⁹ Theodore A. Postol, “Lessons of the Gulf War Experience With Patriot,” International Security 16, no. 3 (1991): 119–71, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539090; Steve Fetter, George N. Lewis, and Lisbeth Gronlund, “Casualties and Damage From Scud Attacks in the 1991 Gulf War,” working paper, Defense and Arms Control Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, March 1993, http://drum.lib.umd.edu/handle/1903/4334; and Eliot Marshall, “Patriot’s Scud Busting Record Is Challenged; MIT Weapons Analyst Theodore Postol Sees an Ominous Lesson: Cheap Decoys May Befuddle Costly Defenses,” Science 252, no. 5006 (May 3, 1991): 640–642, https://www.doi.org/10.1126/science.252.5006.640.

¹⁴⁰ Dinshaw Mistry, Containing Missile Proliferation: Strategic Technology, Security Regimes, and International Cooperation in Arms Control (University of Washington Press, 2011), 99.

¹⁴¹ Chen Qimao, “The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions,” Asian Survey 36, no. 11 (1996): 1,055–1,066, https://doi.org/10.2307/2645635.

¹⁴² Gormley, Missile Contagion, 44.

¹⁴³ William S. Murray, “Revisiting Taiwan’s Defense Strategy,” Naval War College Review 61, no. 3 (2008): 3–4, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol61/iss3/3.

¹⁴⁴ Wendell Minnick, “A Better Indigenous Missile Defense,” Taipei Times, July 13, 2001, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2001/07/13/0000093969.

¹⁴⁵ “Taiwan Switches From Tien Kung I to Tien Kung II,” Janes.com, July 5, 2006.

¹⁴⁶ Wendell Minnick, “Taiwan’s Red Bird Express Service, Rain or Shine,” Intercepts (blog), Defense News, February 27, 2013, http://intercepts.defensenews.com/2013/02/taiwans-red-bird-express-service-rain-or-shine.

¹⁴⁷ “Taiwan Military Confirms ‘Yun Feng’ Missile’s Existence,” Focus Taiwan, October 6, 2021, https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202110060012.

¹⁴⁸ Dorian Archus, “Taiwan Test-Fires Land-Attack Cruise Missile ‘Yun Feng,’” Naval Post, April 28, 2020, https://navalpost.com/taiwan-test-fires-land-attack-cruise-missile-yun-feng.

¹⁴⁹ Emma Helfrich, “Taiwan Official Warns Supersonic Cruise Missile Can Strike Beijing,” The Drive, June 14, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/taiwan-official-warns-supersonic-cruise-missile-can-strike-beijing.

¹⁵⁰ 自由時報電子報, “游錫堃：雲峰飛彈可打到北京 中國侵台前須三思,” 自由時報電子報, June 12, 2022, https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3957585.

¹⁵¹ Matthew Strong, “Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan Passes NT$240-Billion Extra Budget for Missiles, Ships,” Taiwan News, November 23, 2021, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4353985.

¹⁵² Kelvin Chen, “Taiwan’s 2023 Missile Production Expected to Exceed 1,000,” Taiwan News, February 7, 2023, https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4802562.

¹⁵³ “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) – AGM-84H Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) Missiles,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, October 21, 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-16.

¹⁵⁴ “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) – HIMARS, Support, and Equipment,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, October 21, 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-15.

¹⁵⁵ “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) – RGM-84L-4 Harpoon Surface Launched Block II Missiles,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, October 26, 2020, https://www.dsca.mil/press-media/major-arms-sales/taipei-economic-and-cultural-representative-office-united-states-17.

¹⁵⁶ Ryo Nakamura, “U.S. in Talks With Taiwan to Coproduce American Weapons: Sources,” Nikkei Asia, October 19, 2022, https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Taiwan-tensions/U.S.-in-talks-with-Taiwan-to-coproduce-American-weapons-sources.

¹⁵⁷ Ellen Nakashima, “Congress Seeks to Arm Taiwan Quickly as China Threat Grows,” Washington Post, November 14, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/11/13/taiwan-china-invasion-military-aid.